Encouraging or inhibiting: Can analyst attention reduce corporate greenwashing behavior?

Abstract

As an essential mechanism of corporate external governance, it is worth considering whether analyst attention can inhibit corporate greenwashing behavior. Based on the theoretical exploration of the mechanism of analyst attention on corporate greenwashing behavior, this paper, using the data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies, quantitatively finds that analyst attention does not inhibit but rather encourages corporate greenwashing. After a series of robustness tests, the baseline regression results remain consistent. The mechanism test reveals that analyst attention encourages greenwashing due to the information asymmetry, which creates short-term performance pressure. This pressure displaces investments in environmental governance, ultimately increasing the motivation for greenwashing, rather than being driven by collusion between the two parties. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that analyst attention contributes more significantly to corporate greenwashing behavior among non-state-owned firms and firms with a high shareholding ratio of short-term institutional investors. These findings offer valuable insights for developing analyst practices and promoting genuine corporate environmental responsibility.