Miaohui Liu , Xu Xin , Xiaoli Wang , Tao Zhang , Kang Chen
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The container liner shipping industry plays a crucial role in intercontinental trade. In contrast to other modes of transportation, container shipping is subject to seasonal fluctuations in shipping demand. This phenomenon leads shipping companies to oversell slots in the contract market during the high-demand season. Fortunately, the rise of blockchain technology in the container shipping industry offers a potential solution in the form of a blockchain sales channel (BC). In addition, this BC can also enhance logistics transparency in comparison to the traditional sales channel (TC), which in turn increases the trust level of shippers. Under this background, we develop a two-stage Stackelberg game model to address the optimal sales channel selection problem, which involves a shipping company and multiple shippers. This model comprehensively considers the shipping demand seasonal fluctuations, the overselling behavior of the shipping company (under TC) and the higher trust level of shippers (under BC). We analyze the pricing strategies of the shipping company and the slot ordering strategies of shippers and investigate the optimal sales channel for stakeholders. Additionally, we discuss the impact of government subsidies on social welfare under the BC. The results show that i) the growth of logistics transparency may benefit shippers but sometimes damage the interests of the shipping company. The greater the degree of overselling compensation, the more unfavorable it is to shippers’ interests. ii) The emergence of an optimal sales channel for stakeholders depends on the extent of shipping demand seasonal fluctuations, the relationship between the number of slots allocated to the contract and spot markets under BC and TC, and overselling compensation. iii) Government subsidies for blockchain technology can facilitate dual growth in social welfare and supply chain profits. These findings have implications for shipping companies and shippers in selecting sales channels and in providing policy recommendations to governments.
期刊介绍：
Transport Policy is an international journal aimed at bridging the gap between theory and practice in transport. Its subject areas reflect the concerns of policymakers in government, industry, voluntary organisations and the public at large, providing independent, original and rigorous analysis to understand how policy decisions have been taken, monitor their effects, and suggest how they may be improved. The journal treats the transport sector comprehensively, and in the context of other sectors including energy, housing, industry and planning. All modes are covered: land, sea and air; road and rail; public and private; motorised and non-motorised; passenger and freight.
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