Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-01-21 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003
Isabelle Brocas , Juan D. Carrillo
{"title":"Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations","authors":"Isabelle Brocas ,&nbsp;Juan D. Carrillo","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the ability of their peers to behave similarly. With age, participants gradually learn to think strategically and to best respond to their beliefs about others. Overall, the centipede game is an ideal test case for studying the development of abilities, as it disentangles the causes for passing in young children and in teenagers. Interestingly, shrewdness does not transform into earnings, and we document for the first time a game of strategy where payoffs monotonically <em>decrease</em> with age.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"150 ","pages":"Pages 295-311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625000053","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the ability of their peers to behave similarly. With age, participants gradually learn to think strategically and to best respond to their beliefs about others. Overall, the centipede game is an ideal test case for studying the development of abilities, as it disentangles the causes for passing in young children and in teenagers. Interestingly, shrewdness does not transform into earnings, and we document for the first time a game of strategy where payoffs monotonically decrease with age.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
为什么孩子们在蜈蚣游戏中不及格?认知限制与风险计算
8至16岁的儿童和青少年在实验室玩蜈蚣游戏,非平衡行为(通过)可能发生在两个原因:无法逆向归纳(认知限制)或决定对经验风险做出最佳反应并采取衡量机会(行为复杂性)。我们发现逻辑能力是逐渐发展起来的。虽然年轻的参与者(正如预期的那样)最不可能进行逆向归纳,但那些进行逆向归纳的人往往高估了同龄人的能力。随着年龄的增长,参与者逐渐学会战略性思考,并最好地回应他们对他人的看法。总的来说,蜈蚣游戏是研究能力发展的理想测试案例,因为它解开了幼儿和青少年通过的原因。有趣的是,精明并不能转化为收益,我们首次记录了一个收益随着年龄单调减少的策略博弈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries Outcome destabilization Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching Duality in financial networks Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1