Ziyao San , Shuai Wang , Zongfeng Xiu , Ling Zhou , Zejiang Zhou
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
We find that Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOEs) with Disciplinary Commission members on the board experience lower stock price crash risk than their counterparts. This effect is less pronounced for SOEs with more shares held by non-state large shareholders. The results are robust after addressing potential endogeneity issues related to the appointment of the board of directors. Additional analysis suggests that the inclusion of Disciplinary Commission members on the board of directors reduces crash risk by mitigating agency costs, curtailing overinvestment, and improving financial reporting transparency. Collectively, our findings support the notion that the presence of Disciplinary Commission members on the board of directors strengthens the governance of SOEs.
期刊介绍：
The intent of the editors is to consolidate Emerging Markets Review as the premier vehicle for publishing high impact empirical and theoretical studies in emerging markets finance. Preference will be given to comparative studies that take global and regional perspectives, detailed single country studies that address critical policy issues and have significant global and regional implications, and papers that address the interactions of national and international financial architecture. We especially welcome papers that take institutional as well as financial perspectives.
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