{"title":"Combating the rent-seeking among enterprises in China's emissions trading system","authors":"Changyu Liu, Jia Sun, Luhang Zheng, Renkui Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.ememar.2024.101233","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Enterprises engage in rent-seeking with third-party verification authorities (TPs) falsify carbon data has seriously distorted the order of emissions trading system (ETS). Methods of effectively regulating rent-seeking in ETS remain unclear. Based on the analysis of the formation mechanisms of rent-seeking, a tripartite evolutionary game is constructed to explore the interactive behavior of enterprises, TPs, and governments. The important factors affecting the players' behavior were verified using simulation. The results revealed the following: 1) there is a significant correlation between the probability of rent-seeking, probability of acceptation by TPs and the probability of active supervision. 2) based on the evolutionary stability strategy in the game, two kinds of governance mode of rent-seeking are proposed, the market-oriented mode is more efficient than government-led mode; 3) the initial willingness of the tripartite stakeholders, relaxed cost, the penalties for rent-seeking, and the rewards were determined to be critical factors that influence evolutionary results. Finally, the practical countermeasures are recommended to strengthen the collaborative governance of ETS.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47886,"journal":{"name":"Emerging Markets Review","volume":"65 ","pages":"Article 101233"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Emerging Markets Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014124001286","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2024/11/30 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Enterprises engage in rent-seeking with third-party verification authorities (TPs) falsify carbon data has seriously distorted the order of emissions trading system (ETS). Methods of effectively regulating rent-seeking in ETS remain unclear. Based on the analysis of the formation mechanisms of rent-seeking, a tripartite evolutionary game is constructed to explore the interactive behavior of enterprises, TPs, and governments. The important factors affecting the players' behavior were verified using simulation. The results revealed the following: 1) there is a significant correlation between the probability of rent-seeking, probability of acceptation by TPs and the probability of active supervision. 2) based on the evolutionary stability strategy in the game, two kinds of governance mode of rent-seeking are proposed, the market-oriented mode is more efficient than government-led mode; 3) the initial willingness of the tripartite stakeholders, relaxed cost, the penalties for rent-seeking, and the rewards were determined to be critical factors that influence evolutionary results. Finally, the practical countermeasures are recommended to strengthen the collaborative governance of ETS.
期刊介绍：
The intent of the editors is to consolidate Emerging Markets Review as the premier vehicle for publishing high impact empirical and theoretical studies in emerging markets finance. Preference will be given to comparative studies that take global and regional perspectives, detailed single country studies that address critical policy issues and have significant global and regional implications, and papers that address the interactions of national and international financial architecture. We especially welcome papers that take institutional as well as financial perspectives.
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