It takes two to tango: Electoral monitoring by and in authoritarian states, the case of Venezuela

Abstract

The last few decades have seen a significant increase in the study of electoral monitoring processes. This body of work underscores the crucial role of these processes in recognizing democracies and emphasizes the role of electoral monitoring in ensuring the integrity of elections, lending credibility and legitimacy to the outcomes. At the same time, it is important to note that while elections are essential to democratic norms, the mere fact that elections are held is not sufficient to distinguish between democratic and authoritarian regimes, prompting us to delve deeper into exploring the nature of political systems. Moreover, after the third wave of democratization, various forms of electoral authoritarianism proliferated, making the distinction even more difficult (Schedler 2016).

Against this background, it is not surprising that a great deal of literature on electoral monitoring focuses explicitly on the cases of electoral authoritarianism and addresses a type that Walker and Cooley (2013) describe as a “zombie” monitoring process—the election monitors pretend to adhere to international electoral observation standards, but there is a clear preference for and tolerance of undemocratic practices carried out by incumbents (Debre and Morgenbesser 2017). Recently, support for the incumbent president by observers from authoritarian regimes during Venezuela's 2024 presidential election, marked by electoral fraud, clearly highlights the continuous involvement of such actors.

At the same time, it is fundamental to point out that the scholarly contributions we revised approach the topic from a one-dimensional perspective, either from the supply (international) or the demand (domestic) level of electoral observations. In our case, we examine the incidence of zombie electoral monitoring from both sides of the transactional mechanism, combining them with either the democratic or autocratic nature of the suppliers and demanders. We call for the elaboration of a novel theoretical model that effectively pairs entities that cannot be considered separately. This model must not only enable a fertile discussion between two fields of knowledge—international relations and comparative politics—but also offer a renewed perspective on the issue of zombie electoral monitoring considering the propagation of the phenomenon around the world lately.

To illustrate the application of our proposed framework, we will examine one of the most seriously questioned and contested elections in the region in recent years, that of Venezuela. We will discuss Russia's role as a “zombie-type” electoral monitoring supplier and argue that this scenario demonstrates clearly the link we are focused on—the supply-and-demand relationship between autocracies.

Our starting point is that every electoral monitoring process must be understood within a two-tier framework—domestic and international. With this perspective, the existence of supply and demand for such monitoring, although observable, would make more analytical sense. This approach requires examining why some states allow third parties to oversee their elections while others provide or sponsor this type of “service.”

Both concepts are evident in democracies, particularly through a normative lens, where norms are defined as “collective expectations used to evaluate behavior within a given social environment” (Wiener 2018). In democratic contexts, electoral monitoring from the supply side is tied to fostering and maintaining international norms of fair and free elections. This connection is observable in Latin America, where several cases highlight the influence of norms (Planchuelo 2017; Santa-Cruz 2013).

Considering the observations above and following Carothers (1997) approach, Rouvinski and Milanese (2023) highlight that motivated by ideals of peace and democracy, the integrity of electoral processes has become a central aspect of democratic states’ foreign policy. Such a policy focus has facilitated the widespread adoption of electoral monitoring over the past few decades as part of the commitment to fostering democratic societies (Hyde 2011a). It also contributed to developing an international regime for overseeing elections. Moreover, in many scenarios, there is a demand for observation missions originating in democratic governments. In these cases, characterized by free, fair, and competitive elections, the role of monitoring programs tends to be relatively uncontroversial. Usually, it focuses on “certifying” the acceptable quality of the elections. See Freidenberg (2017) for the case of Latin America.

Additionally, observation missions can help resolve disputes. For example, in contexts of high polarization and the proliferation of hate speech—where each election is often perceived as “existential” (The U.S. Presidential Election 2020)—such monitoring can help mitigate the “loser effect,” reducing or minimizing the likelihood of elections being contested (Dahlberg and Linde 2016; Nadeau, Daoust, and Dassonneville 2021). These kinds of disputes could potentially be resolved by a domestic Election Management Body (EMB) that, with solid autonomy, ensures electoral integrity (Dahlberg and Linde 2016).

As Figure 1 shows, EMBs' independence from governments has increased significantly since the late 20th century, revealing excellent results in Europe and promising outcomes in Asia, the Americas, and Oceania. Such is not always the case in lower-quality democracies, where external monitoring programs can play a crucial role in compensating for EMBs' weaknesses and helping to ensure the acceptance of electoral outcomes.

In summary, when referring to democracies, a complementarity between supply and demand creates a symbiotic relationship. This relationship allows the construction of norms at the international level to complement the legitimization of electoral processes and, consequently, governance at the domestic level (see Figure 2).

Yet, as we know, elections are not strictly a democratic phenomenon. If they were, both the supply and demand for electoral monitoring would be significantly more modest. It is in noncompetitive regimes that these processes become more relevant, primarily because one of their main objectives is to deter electoral fraud or amplify social reactions (Bush and Prather 2018; Hyde 2007; Kelley 2012). Indeed, the presence of international observers often doubles the occurrence of boycotts against “dirty” elections (Kelley 2011). From this perspective, why might a nondemocratic or questionable democratic government (1) permit such monitoring and (2) actively seek it? These questions are the core of our discussion.

The answer to the first question we turn to international democracy enforcement. The expectation by democracies to construct norms serves as a robust mechanism to force the entry of observers (Daxecker and Schneider 2014). The paradox relates to the second question, the “invitations” (demand) that might initially seem irrational (Hyde 2011b).

Inviting multiple electoral observation organizations can be functional for semi-competitive regimes, particularly if the case is zombie missions. Although evidence shows that including lenient observations does not enhance the reputation of flawed elections, it allows governments to neutralize the inquisitive effect of rigorous monitoring (Bush, Cottiero, and Prather 2024; Daxecker and Schneider 2014; Donno 2013) through contrasting reports that dilute critical evaluations (Hyde and Marinov 2014).

As Hyde (2007) notes, if high-quality monitoring imposes higher costs on pseudo-democratic regimes, these costs can be mitigated by inviting zombie monitors who, despite appearing democratic, pursue autocratic purposes (Bush, Cottiero, and Prather 2024). Here is where the supply and demand associated with nondemocratic states intersect. While demanders turn to the “shadow market” for the reasons previously outlined such as neutralization, suppliers do so by “hijacking” the related norms, which can be understood as a process of mimicry through which forms of liberal discourse and practices are adopted while simultaneously being given non-liberal content (Bettiza and Lewis 2020). Zombie monitors challenge the norm, but not by abolishing it (Panke and Petersohn 2011). In other words, since electoral observations are internalized norms, there are no incentives for attempting to abolish them, leading instead to their hijacking.

The result of norms hijacking is diminished credibility of international and high-quality electoral monitoring mechanisms (Bush, Cottiero, and Prather 2024; Daxecker and Schneider 2014). As Bettiza and Lewis (2020, p. 9) note, this strategy aims at “relativizing the West's ethical position in world politics, denying the universality of the West's construction of values and assertion of norms.”

Although Russia showed an early interest in participating in electoral monitoring in the 1990s, it is under Vladimir Putin's leadership that there has been a noticeable increase in both the number and scale of these missions in Latin America (see Table 1). It would not be problematic if a significant number of these missions were not used to legitimize the electoral victories of Latin American autocrats (Rouvinski and Milanese 2023), similarly to the work of Russia's observers in Africa (Shekhovtsov 2020) and Eurasia (Planchuelo 2017; Walker and Cooley 2013).

Reviewing the practices of Russian observer missions makes it clear how one of the world's most vocal nondemocratic regimes, aware of the difficulty in abolishing a deeply entrenched (internalized) norm of free and fair elections, develops a strategy of liberal mimicry to hijack it. It involves using the norm to its advantage and benefiting its political allies.

This mimicry process occurs through the assembly of an organization, Russia's Central Election Commission (CEC). Headquartered in Moscow, this entity dispatches election monitors who resemble high-quality electoral monitors in form but differ significantly in content and purpose. Multiple studies have shown that the CEC is not an independent authority despite its formal claim (Chelisheva 2021; Popova 2006; Russian Elections Monitor 2021)—the CEC's close ties with Russian state authorities, especially the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its foreign observer missions, are well-documented (Chelisheva 2021; Popova 2006; Russian Elections Monitor 2021).

From the above perspective and given Venezuela's significance as Moscow's key ally in the region (Rouvinski 2019, 2022), it is unsurprising that Russian observer missions during Venezuela's most internationally criticized elections play a critical role in Russia's foreign policy and soft-power strategies. As Western observer critiques of Venezuela's election integrity have intensified, Russia has increased its political involvement through its election observer missions. As we show below, this is a clear case of supply and demand.

In 2015, Russia sent a modest delegation to Venezuela's elections, which was largely symbolic, fulfilling a 2013 agreement between Venezuela and Russia. The situation shifted in the 2018 elections, when Russia made more efforts to use its observers to support Nicolás Maduro's regime since the demand increased. Venezuela's then-Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza announced the arrival of Russian observers, stating they would “spread the truth” about the elections. Some Russian election officials discouraged “Western” interference openly, while other Russian observers praised the transparency of Venezuela's electoral process (RIA Novosti 2018), making this case for the norms hijacking.

These observer missions were carefully curated to appear as independent civil society representatives, though many were linked to the CEC. Figures such as former CEC officials lauded the election's transparency and compliance with democratic norms despite evidence to the contrary. They also used public forums to praise Venezuela's electoral improvements, comparing them favorably against perceived Western pressure on post-Soviet states. Russian government-controlled media such as Sputnik amplified these perspectives, further reinforcing the legitimacy narrative for Maduro's regime, seeking to neutralize the influence of genuinely independent observers (Sputnik Mundo 2018a, 2018b).

The 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections have become a turning point in the country's political, economic, and social crisis. Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013, is completing his second term amid economic collapse, international sanctions, and increasing authoritarianism. The opposition, weakened by years of persecution and internal divisions, began to unite as the 2024 elections approached, demanding a free and fair electoral process.

In 2023, the opposition held primaries, with María Corina Machado emerging as the leading candidate. The Maduro government blocked her candidacy, citing past legal issues that many saw as politically motivated. The opposition then rallied around Edmundo González, supported by Machado.

International efforts to mediate the political impasse intensified, with talks held in Mexico and supported by countries like Norway. These talks aimed to ensure fair elections through electoral monitoring. Yet, the elections were marred by accusations of voter intimidation and manipulation. While Maduro's government declared victory, the opposition claimed González as the true winner. As before, Russia quickly provided zombie observers to support Maduro's regime, who suggested that the rejection of the election results is orchestrated by the United States (Sputnik Mundo 2024). Hence, both tango dancers sought to generate the neutralization effect by including lenient observations and to counterbalance critical evaluations, thereby diminishing the influence of rigorous monitoring.

In summary, electoral monitoring should be examined from a two-dimensional perspective based on its supply and demand and the type of political regime of both suppliers and demanders. This perspective is characterized by a “two-level game” mechanism that includes domestic and international political dynamics and is closely linked to the existence of democracies and autocracies. In democracies, this process strengthens international norms (supply) and legitimizes electoral processes (demand).

At the same time, while electoral monitoring is meant to detect fraud and strengthen social responses to fraudulent attempts, it can be used in autocracies to downplay the influence of critical election reports (demand). Here, observer missions sent by autocratic regimes aim to hijack norms (supply). By producing lenient reports through “zombie monitoring,” the credibility of rigorous international evaluations can be undermined, as seen in Russia's involvement in Venezuela.