Definition by proxy

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-02-08 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02276-7
Samuel Z. Elgin
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Abstract

I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions (it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the Identification Hypothesis (if F is, by definition, G, then there is a sense in which F is the same as G), Irreflexivity (there are no reflexive definitions), and Leibniz’s Law. Additionally, it possesses the resources needed to resolve the paradox of analysis.

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代理定义
根据高阶逻辑的最新发展,我向实定义理论迈出了一些初步的步骤。由此产生的帐户允许极细粒度的区分(它可以区分语法结构不同的任何关联,同时避免罗素- myhill问题)。它是第一个能够始终如一地包含三个最初看起来不相容的理想逻辑原则的解释:识别假设(如果F根据定义是G,那么在某种意义上F与G是相同的),非反身性(没有反身性定义)和莱布尼茨定律。此外,它还拥有解决分析悖论所需的资源。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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