A novel power flow approach for calculating the steady-state of secondary control in islanded microgrids under cyberattacks

Abstract

Under ideal conditions, state-of-the-art methods for computing the power flow of islanded microgrids (MGs) are adequate for estimating the steady-state of the MG. However, this paper demonstrates that cyberattacks targeting the secondary control of the MG can significantly alter the power and frequency of the MG. In such scenarios, these traditional methods fall short, as they do not incorporate the effects of secondary control actions. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a novel power flow formulation incorporating secondary control equations of MGs under cyberattacks. The resulting system is a nonlinear mathematical model, solvable using standard nonlinear solvers such as the Newton Trust Region method. This proposed formulation significantly advances conventional power flow analysis by enabling, for the first time, the computation of steady-state impacts of cyberattacks on the secondary control of islanded MGs. Simulations conducted on 6-bus and 12-bus islanded MGs confirm that the results of the proposed approach match those of Simulink, demonstrating the high accuracy of the method. Moreover, they underscore the advancements of the proposed approach compared to the standard power flow methods traditionally used for steady-state modeling of islanded MGs.