IID prophet inequality with a single data point

IF 5.1 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Artificial Intelligence Pub Date : 2025-02-07 DOI:10.1016/j.artint.2025.104296
Yilong Feng , Bo Li , Haolong Li , Xiaowei Wu , Yutong Wu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this work, we study the single-choice prophet inequality problem, where a seller encounters a sequence of n online bids. These bids are modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables drawn from an unknown distribution. Upon the revelation of each bid's value, the seller must make an immediate and irrevocable decision on whether to accept the bid and sell the item to the bidder. The objective is to maximize the competitive ratio between the expected gain of the seller and that of the maximum bid. It is shown by Correa et al. [1] that when the distribution is unknown or only o(n) uniform samples from the distribution are given, the best an algorithm can do is 1/e-competitive. In contrast, when the distribution is known [2], or when Ω(n) uniform samples are given [3], the optimal competitive ratio of 0.7451 can be achieved. In this paper, we study the setting when the seller has access to a single point in the cumulative density function of the distribution, which can be learned from historical sales data. We investigate how effectively this data point can be used to design competitive algorithms. Motivated by the algorithm for the secretary problem, we propose the observe-and-accept algorithm that sets a threshold in the first phase using the data point and adopts the highest bid from the first phase as the threshold for the second phase. It can be viewed as a natural combination of the single-threshold algorithm for prophet inequality and the secretary problem algorithm. We show that our algorithm achieves a good competitive ratio for a wide range of data points, reaching up to 0.6785-competitive as n for certain data points. Additionally, we study an extension of the algorithm that utilizes more than two phases and show that the competitive ratio can be further improved to at least 0.6862.
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Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence 工程技术-计算机:人工智能
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
1.40%
发文量
118
审稿时长
8 months
期刊介绍: The Journal of Artificial Intelligence (AIJ) welcomes papers covering a broad spectrum of AI topics, including cognition, automated reasoning, computer vision, machine learning, and more. Papers should demonstrate advancements in AI and propose innovative approaches to AI problems. Additionally, the journal accepts papers describing AI applications, focusing on how new methods enhance performance rather than reiterating conventional approaches. In addition to regular papers, AIJ also accepts Research Notes, Research Field Reviews, Position Papers, Book Reviews, and summary papers on AI challenges and competitions.
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