Theoretical limitations on mindreading measures: Commentary on Wendt et al. (2024).

Abstract

In this Commentary article, we expand on issues in the theory of mind literature raised by Wendt et al. (2024) that limit progress in our understanding of how people read other minds. We critically assess how they categorized tasks in their study and, in so doing, raise deeper questions that need addressing: What exactly are mental states; how can we accurately measure mindreading when the "correct" answer lacks ground truth; and what are the contributions to individual differences in mindreading of general cognitive ability and specific experience in the kinds of minds being read? We conclude that developing a psychological theory of how people read other minds would advance ways in which we can better measure and explain what it means to be better or worse at mindreading and how general cognitive ability relates to this sociocognitive skill. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).