Affirmative action, college access and major choice: Redistribution with strategic behavior

Abstract

I estimate the redistributive and behavioral effects of a race-neutral affirmative action policy targeting low-income applicants at a flagship university in Brazil. I find that the policy redistributed college seats toward applicants from low socioeconomic backgrounds and underrepresented racial groups, increasing their representation in selective majors. This diversity gain came with an expected decrease in the average achievement of the incoming cohort but retained admissions for candidates in the upper half of the statewide achievement distribution. Applicants also responded strategically to the policy by adjusting their application choices, resulting in a reduction of the socioeconomic gap in applications to selective majors by 21 percent of the unconditional gap and 36 percent when comparing applicants with similar academic backgrounds and demographic characteristics. However, while some applicants successfully updated their choices, others aimed too high and missed their chance of admission—an especially costly outcome for the targeted group.