Frege's triangle and Austin's square: the meaning and use of no-predicates in English

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of no and not in English nominal copular sentences, couched in the speech-act theoretical framework original to J. L. Austin's “How to talk—Some simple ways” (1953/1989). I show that these negators differ in their speech act potential in this environment, and offer an explanation for the difference in meaning found in copular sentences containing them: the combination of the predicate nominal, analyzed as a Fregean concept, with no, results in a meaning that is distinct from nominal copular sentences occurring with not, and also different from the meaning found in sentences in which no combines with a nominal argument or in the postverbal position of the existential there-sentence. This work contributes to our understanding of the relationship between predication and negation and the interpretation and use of nominal predicates.