Response to Jesudason on ethical problems with kindness in healthcare.

Abstract

In this paper, we respond to a recent article by Edwin Jesudason regarding the ethical problems associated with kindness in healthcare. Jesudason contends that kindness contributes to unkind outcomes such as discrimination and systemic problems in healthcare. We disagree with his above assertion by forwarding three arguments. First, we question his association of kindness with favouritism through his conflation of favour with favouritism. We counter that doing someone a favour does not necessarily mean that preferential treatment is involved. Second, we object to his interpretation of discretionary kindness as possessing 'circumscribed scope', that is, doing favours to the ingroup and leaving out others. We maintain that the discretionary element of kindness does not denote inclusivity and instead refers to the judgement and prudence needed for a person to act kindly in specific circumstances. Our third argument concerns Jesudason's emphasis on kindness as an action. By focussing on kind acts, he has inadvertently overlooked kindness as a moral value, attitude and inclination of a person. Overall, Jesudason has provided an inadequate explanation of kindness as a virtue. We suggest that a kind person does not promote or condone unkind outcomes such as prejudice, abuses and structural problems in healthcare. Instead, such a person goes beyond discrete kind acts and ingroup loyalty to actively demonstrate compassion, generosity and assistance towards those in need in a spontaneous and consistent manner.