Exemplary cooperation strategy with positive influence enhances cooperation quality in social dilemma

Abstract

An exemplary cooperation strategy with completely altruistic behavior is studied in this paper. This strategy not only exhibits altruism comparable to that of ordinary cooperators, but also exerts a power of good example through its unconditional cost, and influences the defector to give unforced-feedback. The findings indicate that even in the face of high temptation, exemplary cooperation strategies can also effectively prevent the total expansion of defection strategies and coexist with them. When the three strategies coexist, higher temptation does not promote defection but rather enhances the quality of cooperation to some extent. Moreover, the increase in unforced-feedback from defectors leads to a rise in the proportion of ordinary cooperation. Notably, the exemplary cooperation strategy can maintain a certain level in the population even in an unfavorable environment for cooperation, thus preventing the population from a state of full defectors. In general, the introduction of exemplary cooperation strategies fosters the development of cooperation to a certain extent. It offers a fresh perspective for understanding the emergence and sustenance of cooperative behavior.