Subnational Lobbying on National Policymaking: Evidence From Germany

Abstract

While research on subnational lobbying has advanced considerably in recent years, much less is known about the role of lower levels in the context of multilevel lobbying. In a multilevel system, interest groups can pursue different routes for influence-seeking. These include a domestic subnational route to seek amendments on a bill by lobbying regional governments, and a subnational-Brussels route, based on regions' influence on EU policymaking. Investigating the case of Germany, we analyze observational and survey data on interest groups and their route choices in the context of 23 legislative proposals that were drafted in the year 2019. Our findings highlight the importance of subnational lobbying for national policymaking. It is neither an exclusive strategy of outsiders on the national level, nor one pursued exclusively by local and regional actors. Furthermore, subnational lobbying is more likely when interest groups and subnational governments share common goals.