Reluctance to Downplay: Asymmetric Sensitivity to Differences in the Severity of Moral Transgressions.

Abstract

A common-sense moral intuition is that bad acts should be condemned according to severity. Yet seven experiments (N = 6,075 U.S. adults) show that the extent to which people differentiate between transgressions hinges on the direction of comparison. When scaling up from a less severe transgression to a more severe one, people readily express stronger condemnation of the worse transgression. But when scaling down from a more severe transgression to a less severe one, they differentiate less, often condemning the lesser transgression just as strongly as one that is transparently worse. Indicating that one transgression is less bad than another can be construed as downplaying such transgressions, signaling bad moral character. Supporting this account, the asymmetry is larger for judgments that implicate moral character and for transgressions that seem especially important to condemn. Observers' moral-character judgments reveal a similar pattern, suggesting that the asymmetry is reinforced by social incentives.