Psychological Science最新文献

Metacognition involves second-order judgments about first-order judgments. It remains unclear whether an individual's confidence in being correct is generated by the same system across tasks (domain generality) or whether it is computed independently in the context of each task (domain specificity). Previous studies have focused on correlations across several tasks, yet the evidence is mixed, and more complex models of domain generality were not taken into account. Analyzing data from 10 tasks collected across three studies in Denmark and Poland (N = 253-547 adult participants), we found a fixed pattern of cross-task correlations for both metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency. In accordance with previous studies, we found that hierarchical estimation of metacognitive efficiency led to higher correlations. We used confirmatory factor analyses to investigate the existence of general processes. We found evidence for a weak domain generality with a metacognitive module for perceptual tasks and another for cognitive tasks.

Do individuals possess a "gaze fingerprint" that reveals how they uniquely look at the world? We tested this question by examining intra- and intersubject gaze similarity across 700 static pictures of complex natural scenes. Independent discovery (n = 105) and replication data sets (n = 46) of adults aged 18 to 50 years (sampled from Italy and Germany) revealed that gaze fingerprinting is possible at relatively high rates (e.g., 52%-63%) compared with chance (e.g., 1%-2%). We also identify gaze-fingerprint barcodes, which reveal a unique individualized code describing which stimuli an individual can be gaze-fingerprinted on. Preregistered longitudinal follow-up experiments have shown that gaze-fingerprint barcodes are nonrandom within an individual over short and long time fraframmes. Finally, we find that increased gaze fingerprintability for social stimuli is associated with decreased levels of autistic traits. To summarize, this work showcases the potential of gaze fingerprinting for isolating traitlike factors that may be of high neurodevelopmental and biological significance.

Pretending not to know requires appreciating how one would behave without a given piece of knowledge and acting accordingly. Here, two game-based experiments reveal a capacity to simulate decision-making under such counterfactual ignorance. English-speaking adults (N = 1,001) saw the solution to a game (ship locations in Battleship, the hidden word in Hangman) but attempted to play as though they never had this information. Pretenders accurately mimicked broad aspects of genuine play, including the number of guesses required to reach a solution, as well as subtle patterns, such as the effects of decision uncertainty on decision time. Although peers were unable to detect pretense, statistical analysis and computational modeling uncovered traces of overacting in pretenders' decisions, suggesting a schematic simulation of their minds. Opening up a new approach to studying self-simulation, our results reveal intricate metacognitive knowledge about decision-making, drawn from a rich-but simplified-internal model of cognition.

Nedergaard and Lupyan (2024) presented four studies aimed at validating anendophasia (i.e., experiencing no inner speech).¹ However, Lind (2025) held that no one, including Nedergaard and Lupyan, has demonstrated that anendophasia exists. In both articles, the authors support their positions using the findings of descriptive experience sampling. Here, I show that descriptive experience sampling is a fidelity-aspiring method; I highlight the distinction between fidelity and validity (an important distinction for psychological science in general and for anendophasia in particular). Anendophasia is an experiential phenomenon, not a construct, and therefore requires incorporating fidelity-based investigations. Nedergaard and Lupyan treated anendophasia as a construct (providing validity-based investigations), but drew phenomenon-based conclusions. I distinguish between completely and mostly anendophasic individuals, noting that, in practice, that distinction might be impossible to make. I suggest that anendophasic (or at least mostly anendophasic) individuals do in fact exist (probably frequently) and are worthy of fidelity-based (as well as validational) investigations.

Americans readily identify with class labels, such as working class and middle class. In turn, these identities affect their social affiliations, cultural values, and physical health. Despite theoretical predictions that class identity can change, little work has empirically examined the long-term malleability of class identity. Here we ask, can class identity change in the long term? And if so, when? We tested this question by examining whether the 2008 Great Recession changed how Americans viewed their social and economic standing in society-that is, their class identity. In three of four data sets (total N = 164,296), we found that the 2008 Great Recession shifted Americans toward identifying as a lower class. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of the formation of class identity and for the political and social development of the United States following 2008.

People overaccept information that supports their identity and underaccept information that opposes their identity-a phenomenon known as partisan bias. Although partisan-bias effects in judgments of misinformation are robust and pervasive, there is ongoing debate about whether partisan-bias effects arise from identity-protective motivated reasoning or differential knowledge of identity-congenial versus identity-uncongenial information. Prior empirical work has been unable to differentiate the two accounts because of a reliance on groups with pre-existing differences in knowledge (e.g., Democrats and Republicans). The current research addresses this issue by using randomly assigned rather than pre-existing identities. Across two experiments (N_total = 1,411), adult U.S. Prolific workers showed lower thresholds for accepting information that is congenial versus uncongenial to a randomly assigned identity, despite having no differences in prior knowledge. These results support theories that emphasize identity protection as a factor underlying partisan bias in the acceptance of misinformation, with important practical implications for misinformation interventions.

Prosocial behavior is common and often socially rewarded (e.g., via liking, status, and trust). Yet prior research has found that if actors themselves also benefit from their prosocial behavior, then they are morally derogated: They are evaluated as worse than purely selfish actors. This tainted-altruism effect has been explained by the use of different counterfactuals for the evaluation of prosocial and selfish actors. Here I propose social rewards protection theory, which explains why evaluators use these different counterfactuals in the first place: Social rewards are treated as being reserved for costly prosocial actions. Claiming such rewards without incurring costs seems like cheating and thus deserves moral derogation. Accordingly, being transparent about the action's costs and benefits prevents such derogation. I conducted six experiments (five preregistered) with Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers in the United States and lab participants in Spain (total N = 4,732 adults). The findings provide support for the proposed functional explanation of tainted altruism, which also sheds light on related phenomena, such as overhead aversion and hypocrisy.

An inherent feature of any choice is the set size from which that choice is made (i.e., the number of available options in a choice set). Choice set size impacts the likelihood of landing on a more preferred option: Larger sets are more likely to contain an option matching one's preferences. Nevertheless, in six preregistered experiments with 10,092 U.S. adults, we demonstrated that people consistently underestimated the effect of set size when predicting others' liking for a chosen option. We propose this effect arises because, although people recognize that set size predicts liking of a chosen option, they typically fail to attend to it when considering others' choices. Accordingly, this effect was attenuated when attention was drawn to set size, specifically (a) when participants considered multiple set sizes simultaneously, (b) when the decision process was framed as ranking rather than choosing, or (c) when participants were prompted to recall set size before predicting others' preferences.

Context drives our interpretations of music as surprising, frightening, or awe-inspiring. However, it remains unclear how formal musical training affects our ability to hierarchically integrate complex tonal information to efficiently predict, remember, and segment music. We scrambled naturalistic music at multiple timescales to manipulate coherent tonal context while controlling for multiple acoustic cues. Memory (Experiment 1; n = 108, age range = 19-41 years) and prediction (Experiment 2; n = 108, age range = 20-41 years) improved with more intact context for both musicians and nonmusicians. Listeners' event boundaries were influenced by the amount of tonal context but also reflected nested phrase structure, and musicians were more sensitive to longer-timescale "hyperphrase" structure (Experiment 3; n = 95, age range = 20-42 years) and could better identify the amount of scrambling (Experiment 4; n = 108, age range = 19-41 years). These results indicate that listeners integrate tonal context across complex phrases to efficiently encode, predict, and segment naturalistic music and that in general, training has surprisingly little impact on this integration.

Childhood language interventions appear promising for improving children's lives and yielding economic returns. However, few studies have evaluated long-term effects of these interventions. Our study did this using a large, cluster-randomized trial of a preschool intervention for Norwegian children aged 4 to 5 years whose vocabulary was more limited than that of their peers. Results showed that effects on expressive language were maintained at the 7-month follow-up when the children were in first grade and that those with the weakest language skills initially had the largest and most persistent effects. However, 4 years after the intervention, the differences between the intervention and control groups were negligible. Thus, although effects from the preschool language intervention lasted into the first year of elementary school, effects eventually faded and were completely absent in fourth grade. Our findings suggest the need for a sustained approach to language and literacy support, focusing on persistent interventions and high-quality adapted instruction.