Towards Excellence: Virtue and the Principle of Autonomy in Informed Consent for Clinical Trials.

Abstract

In this article, I argue that approximating virtues such as care and respectfulness are necessary to conduct an informed consent discussion for clinical trials adequately. I argue against Beauchamp and Childress' principlism insofar as it claims that virtues do not have "advantages" over the principle of respecting autonomy. When we elaborate what it means to facilitate autonomy in a consent discussion adequately, we find we are describing the virtues. This is because virtues do have an advantage over principles insofar as virtues provide us with rich descriptions of not only what we should do (respect autonomy), but how to do so (with the virtues of respectfulness, care, etc.). Thus, the principle of respecting autonomy points back to the virtues. I conclude by showing how cultivation of these virtues can help rectify well-known shortcomings in the informed consent process.