On cyber sabotage risks in automated manufacturing of advanced composites

Abstract

Recent advancements in the manufacturing of layered composite structures have seen the deployment of automated control systems, with computers used for both design protocols and control of manufacturing processes. However, as digitisation and computerisation of composites manufacturing advances, so too grows the potential exposure to cyber-attacks. Given that large manufacturing companies, government organisations, and defence agencies are increasingly utilising parts made out of fibre-reinforced composite materials, this security exposure must be acknowledged and managed carefully.

From other computerised manufacturing domains, we know that adversaries may aim to steal technical data such as digital design files (for example, for espionage or to infringe on Intellectual Property, IP) or to sabotage manufactured parts. Both can have consequences reaching far beyond immediate financial or physical damage. While it can be assumed that the adversarial goals are similar for composites manufacturing, the attack methods have not been explored or studied yet. This paper seeks to address this gap in part, by providing the first holistic security analysis of potential sabotage attacks in automated composites manufacturing using modern equipment. This security analysis provides a framework for composite manufacturers to identify vulnerabilities in their production workflows that are susceptible to cyber-attacks, while also providing opportunity to design customised countermeasures to strengthen the security of their automated manufacturing processes.