Network stability under limited foresight

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-07-01 Epub Date: 2025-04-09 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.002
P. Jean-Jacques Herings , Abhimanyu Khan
{"title":"Network stability under limited foresight","authors":"P. Jean-Jacques Herings ,&nbsp;Abhimanyu Khan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a decision-theoretic and cognitive-hierarchy based notion of network stability by examining the decision-making nodes' incentives to change the structure of a network by establishing/dissolving links in between them. While evaluating the desirability of initiating such changes, each node internalizes, to the extent of its limited foresight, the effect of further changes that may be induced thereafter. The nodes may exhibit heterogeneity in their level of foresight, and coalitions of nodes may collectively alter the network structure. We define a limited foresight stable set as our stability concept. The primary characteristic of this set, which always exists and is unique, is that the process of link additions/deletions always leads to networks in this set. This set may vary with both the extent and heterogeneity of the nodes' foresight, and with the possibility of coalitional deviations – so, we present “tight” sufficient conditions under which this set is independent of these considerations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"152 ","pages":"Pages 62-92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562500048X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2025/4/9 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We propose a decision-theoretic and cognitive-hierarchy based notion of network stability by examining the decision-making nodes' incentives to change the structure of a network by establishing/dissolving links in between them. While evaluating the desirability of initiating such changes, each node internalizes, to the extent of its limited foresight, the effect of further changes that may be induced thereafter. The nodes may exhibit heterogeneity in their level of foresight, and coalitions of nodes may collectively alter the network structure. We define a limited foresight stable set as our stability concept. The primary characteristic of this set, which always exists and is unique, is that the process of link additions/deletions always leads to networks in this set. This set may vary with both the extent and heterogeneity of the nodes' foresight, and with the possibility of coalitional deviations – so, we present “tight” sufficient conditions under which this set is independent of these considerations.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
有限预见下的网络稳定性
我们提出了一种基于决策理论和认知层次的网络稳定性概念,研究了决策节点通过建立/解散它们之间的联系来改变网络结构的动机。在评估启动此类变化的可取性时,每个节点都会在其有限的预见能力范围内,将此后可能引发的进一步变化的影响内在化。节点的预见水平可能存在差异,节点联盟可能会共同改变网络结构。我们将有限预见稳定集定义为稳定性概念。该集合始终存在且独一无二,其主要特征是链接的添加/删除过程始终会导致网络处于该集合中。这个集合可能会随着节点预见的程度和异质性以及联盟偏差的可能性而变化--因此,我们提出了 "严密 "的充分条件,使这个集合不受这些因素的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
Compellingness in Nash implementation Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment Welfare properties of the Taiwan mechanism Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1