Cream-skimming in deregulated social health insurance: evidence from Switzerland.

Abstract

Policymakers fear that health insurers when exposed to competition will engage in cream-skimming (i.e. selection of good risks) rather than trying to improve their benefit to premium ratio. This fear surfaced also when Swiss federal government proposed pro-competitive Law on social health insurance, which barely passed a popular referendum in 1994. While a risk equalization mechanism based on age, gender, and place of residence has already been created, there is a considerable interest in improving its formula. This paper shows that a dummy variable indicating an individual's death during the period of observation causes the coefficient of determination to jump from 0.039 to 0.111. More-over, simulations of the risk selection process suggest that risk equalization should be made a permanent institution rather than being limited to a life of 10 years as prescribed by present legislation. In fact, the formula in use, with all its shortcomings, can be shown to neutralize to a great extent insurer interest in cream skimming provided he takes a longer-run view.