Timo R Lambregts, Paul van Bruggen, Han Bleichrodt
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引用次数: 4
Abstract
An important societal problem is that people underinsure against risks that are unlikely or occur in the far future, such as natural disasters and long-term care needs. One explanation is that uncertainty about the risk of non-reimbursement induces ambiguity averse and risk prudent decision makers to take out less insurance. We set up an insurance experiment to test this explanation. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that the demand for insurance is lower when the nonperformance risk is ambiguous than when it is known and when decision makers are risk prudent. We cannot attribute the lower take-up of insurance to our measure of ambiguity aversion, probably because ambiguity attitudes are richer than aversion alone.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11166-021-09364-7.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (JRU) welcomes original empirical, experimental, and theoretical manuscripts dealing with the analysis of risk-bearing behavior and decision making under uncertainty. The topics covered in the journal include, but are not limited to, decision theory and the economics of uncertainty, experimental investigations of behavior under uncertainty, empirical studies of real world risk-taking behavior, behavioral models of choice under uncertainty, and risk and public policy. Review papers are welcome.
The JRU does not publish finance or behavioral finance research, game theory, note length work, or papers that treat Likert-type scales as having cardinal significance.
An important aim of the JRU is to encourage interdisciplinary communication and interaction between researchers in the area of risk and uncertainty. Authors are expected to provide introductory discussions which set forth the nature of their research and the interpretation and implications of their findings in a manner accessible to knowledgeable researchers in other disciplines.
Officially cited as: J Risk Uncertain
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