Relative fluency (unfelt vs felt) in active inference

Abstract

For a growing number of researchers, it is now accepted that the brain is a predictive organ that predicts the content of the sensorium and crucially the precision of—or confidence in—its own predictions. In order to predict the precision of its predictions, the brain has to infer the reliability of its own beliefs. This means that our brains have to recognise the precision of their predictions or, at least, their accuracy. In this paper, we argue that fluency is product of this recognition process. In short, to recognise fluency is to infer that we have a precise ‘grip’ on the unfolding processes that generate our sensations. More specifically, we propose that it is changes in fluency — from unfelt to felt — that are both recognised and realised when updating predictions about precision. Unfelt fluency orients attention to unpredicted sensations, while felt fluency supervenes on—and contextualises—unfelt fluency; thereby rendering certain attentional processes, phenomenologically opaque. As such, fluency underwrites the precision we place in our predictions and therefore acts upon our perceptual inferences. Hence, the causes of conscious subjective inference have unconscious perceptual precursors.