Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774
Benjamin Kozuch
Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory’s own domain, but also from its complementary domain (e.g., neuroscientific evidence is used to judge a philosophical theory, and vice versa). This approach works when a neuroscientific and a philosophical theory are conceptually linked, allowing evidence confirming or disconfirming one theory to do the same for the other. After developing this method, the article uses it to draw conclusions concerning some of our leading neuroscientific and philosophical theories of consciousness, including first- and second-order representationalism and theories emphasizing the prefrontal cortex’s role in consciousness.
{"title":"Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness","authors":"Benjamin Kozuch","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory’s own domain, but also from its complementary domain (e.g., neuroscientific evidence is used to judge a philosophical theory, and vice versa). This approach works when a neuroscientific and a philosophical theory are conceptually linked, allowing evidence confirming or disconfirming one theory to do the same for the other. After developing this method, the article uses it to draw conclusions concerning some of our leading neuroscientific and philosophical theories of consciousness, including first- and second-order representationalism and theories emphasizing the prefrontal cortex’s role in consciousness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142569217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772
Peter Ulric Tse
Epistemological and ontological conceptions of information are contrasted. The former are based on acts of decoding of extrinsic inputs that result in a decoder becoming informed. The latter are based on intrinsic states or state changes of the system independent of any external factors such as inputs to the system. Ontological conceptions of information, such as those that underlie integrated information theory or any theory that allies itself with panpsychism, are not able to account for consciousness. In the only physical systems that are known to be conscious, namely, animal brains, acts of decoding extrinsic inputs are central to creating consciousness and its contents. Moreover, only a very specific subset of decodings should realize consciousness, because consciousness in animals evolved to create an evaluative experience of what is intrinsically true about the world and the body, which is then used in a perception–action cycle that affords choices among options for behaving in the world in order to accomplish goals.
{"title":"Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness","authors":"Peter Ulric Tse","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Epistemological and ontological conceptions of information are contrasted. The former are based on acts of decoding of extrinsic inputs that result in a decoder becoming informed. The latter are based on intrinsic states or state changes of the system independent of any external factors such as inputs to the system. Ontological conceptions of information, such as those that underlie integrated information theory or any theory that allies itself with panpsychism, are not able to account for consciousness. In the only physical systems that are known to be conscious, namely, animal brains, acts of decoding extrinsic inputs are central to creating consciousness and its contents. Moreover, only a very specific subset of decodings should realize consciousness, because consciousness in animals evolved to create an evaluative experience of what is intrinsically true about the world and the body, which is then used in a perception–action cycle that affords choices among options for behaving in the world in order to accomplish goals.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142548815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our thought states change without intention. This study verified that the transition of thought states varies with fluctuations in autonomic nervous activity, and that this effect is modulated by interoceptive accuracy. The participants completed the heartbeat counting task (HCT) and vigilance task. We assessed the participants’ interoceptive accuracy based on their performance on the HCT. The vigilance task is a simple attention task, and during this task, we asked the participants to report the content and contemplation of their thoughts. Consequently, participants with accurate interoception were more likely to remain in a highly contemplative thought state when parasympathetic activity was suppressed. In contrast, the dominance of parasympathetic activity facilitated transitions to different thought states or experiences of less contemplative thought states in them. The results suggest that even subtle changes in bodily responses at rest can affect thought transitions in people with accurate interoception.
{"title":"The body mirroring thought: The relationship between thought transitions and fluctuations in autonomic nervous activity mediated by interoception","authors":"Mai Sakuragi , Kazushi Shinagawa , Yuri Terasawa , Satoshi Umeda","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103770","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103770","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Our thought states change without intention. This study verified that the transition of thought states varies with fluctuations in autonomic nervous activity, and that this effect is modulated by interoceptive accuracy. The participants completed the heartbeat counting task (HCT) and vigilance task. We assessed the participants’ interoceptive accuracy based on their performance on the HCT. The vigilance task is a simple attention task, and during this task, we asked the participants to report the content and contemplation of their thoughts. Consequently, participants with accurate interoception were more likely to remain in a highly contemplative thought state when parasympathetic activity was suppressed. In contrast, the dominance of parasympathetic activity facilitated transitions to different thought states or experiences of less contemplative thought states in them. The results suggest that even subtle changes in bodily responses at rest can affect thought transitions in people with accurate interoception.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142445458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103763
Parnian Jalalian, Marius Golubickis, Yadvi Sharma, C. Neil Macrae
Personal relevance exerts a powerful influence on decisional processing, such that arbitrary stimuli associated with the self are classified more rapidly than identical material linked with other people. Notwithstanding numerous demonstrations of this facilitatory effect, it remains unclear whether self-prioritization is a temporally stable outcome of decision-making. Accordingly, using a shape-label matching task in combination with computational modeling, the current experiment investigated this matter. The results were informative. First, regardless of the target of comparison (i.e., friend or stranger), self-prioritization was a persistent product of decision-making across the testing session. Second, a variant of the standard drift diffusion model in which decisional boundaries collapsed gradually over the course of the task best fit the observed data. Third, whereas the efficiency of stimulus processing increased for other-related stimuli during the task, it decreased for self-related material. Collectively, these findings advance understanding of the temporal profile of self-prioritization.
{"title":"The temporal profile of self-prioritization","authors":"Parnian Jalalian, Marius Golubickis, Yadvi Sharma, C. Neil Macrae","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103763","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103763","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Personal relevance exerts a powerful influence on decisional processing, such that arbitrary stimuli associated with the self are classified more rapidly than identical material linked with other people. Notwithstanding numerous demonstrations of this facilitatory effect, it remains unclear whether self-prioritization is a temporally stable outcome of decision-making. Accordingly, using a shape-label matching task in combination with computational modeling, the current experiment investigated this matter. The results were informative. First, regardless of the target of comparison (i.e., friend or stranger), self-prioritization was a persistent product of decision-making across the testing session. Second, a variant of the standard drift diffusion model in which decisional boundaries collapsed gradually over the course of the task best fit the observed data. Third, whereas the efficiency of stimulus processing increased for other-related stimuli during the task, it decreased for self-related material. Collectively, these findings advance understanding of the temporal profile of self-prioritization.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142382350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103773
Mario Dalmaso , Giovanni Galfano , Luigi Castelli
Arrows trigger reflexive shifts of attention and instantiate the prototypical example of automated symbolic orienting. We conducted four experiments to further test the boundary conditions of this phenomenon. Participants discriminated a peripheral target while spatially uninformative arrows, pointing leftwards or rightwards, appeared at fixation. In all experiments, arrow direction could either randomly vary (intermixed condition) or be kept constant within a block of trials (blocked condition). Moreover, in Experiments 3 and 4, a direction word presented at the beginning of the trial informed participants about the target location with 100% certainty. Overall, the results highlighted a significant arrow-driven orienting effect in both the blocked and the intermixed conditions. The present findings support the notion that automated symbolic orienting is resistant to suppression in that it endures even when the context should stress the uninformative nature of the arrows while also creating ideal conditions to boost participants’ tendency to ignore them.
{"title":"Stretching the limits of automated symbolic orienting","authors":"Mario Dalmaso , Giovanni Galfano , Luigi Castelli","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103773","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103773","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Arrows trigger reflexive shifts of attention and instantiate the prototypical example of automated symbolic orienting. We conducted four experiments to further test the boundary conditions of this phenomenon. Participants discriminated a peripheral target while spatially uninformative arrows, pointing leftwards or rightwards, appeared at fixation. In all experiments, arrow direction could either randomly vary (intermixed condition) or be kept constant within a block of trials (blocked condition). Moreover, in Experiments 3 and 4, a direction word presented at the beginning of the trial informed participants about the target location with 100% certainty. Overall, the results highlighted a significant arrow-driven orienting effect in both the blocked and the intermixed conditions. The present findings support the notion that automated symbolic orienting is resistant to suppression in that it endures even when the context should stress the uninformative nature of the arrows while also creating ideal conditions to boost participants’ tendency to ignore them.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142512684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103767
Giorgia Tosi , Noemi Bonali , Daniele Romano
Embodiment refers to the possibility of processing external objects as part of one’s body. Similarly, absorption refers to the subjective experience of being absorbed in a narrative text and identifying with characters. Embodiment and absorption in literary texts have in common the idea of finding oneself in someone else’s shoes. Recent studies have shown that embodiment is influenced by the perspective used to induce the illusion. The present study aimed to assess whether absorption in literary texts was modulated by perspective too. We first confirmed the reliability of the absorption measure (Story World Absorption Scale − SWAS) in Italian. Then, we used a Bayesian approach to assess the impact of the story perspective on the perceived absorption. Our results showed that, unlike embodiment, the level of absorption is not influenced by the narrative’s perspective, suggesting that different processes underlie the two experiences of self-projection.
{"title":"Finding oneself in someone else’s shoes: The role of perspective in literary texts","authors":"Giorgia Tosi , Noemi Bonali , Daniele Romano","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103767","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103767","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Embodiment refers to the possibility of processing external objects as part of one’s body. Similarly, absorption refers to the subjective experience of being absorbed in a narrative text and identifying with characters. Embodiment and absorption in literary texts have in common the idea of finding oneself in someone else’s shoes. Recent studies have shown that embodiment is influenced by the perspective used to induce the illusion. The present study aimed to assess whether absorption in literary texts was modulated by perspective too. We first confirmed the reliability of the absorption measure (Story World Absorption Scale − SWAS) in Italian. Then, we used a Bayesian approach to assess the impact of the story perspective on the perceived absorption. Our results showed that, unlike embodiment, the level of absorption is not influenced by the narrative’s perspective, suggesting that different processes underlie the two experiences of self-projection.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142407133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103769
Benjamin Rebouillat , Nicolas Barascud , Sid Kouider
Despite our feeling of control over decisions, our ability to consciously access choices before execution remains debated. Recent research reveals prospective access to intention to act, allowing potential vetoes of impending decisions. However, whether the content of impending decision can be accessed remain debated. Here we track neural signals during participants’ early deliberation in free decisions. Participants chose freely between two options but sometimes had to reject their current decision just before execution. The initially preferred option, tracked in real time, significantly predicts the upcoming choice, but remain mostly outside of conscious awareness. Participants often display overconfidence in their access to this content. Instead, confidence is associated with a neural marker of self-initiated decision, indicating a qualitative confusion in the confidence evaluation process. Our results challenge the notion of complete agency over choices, suggesting inflated awareness of forthcoming decisions and providing insights into metacognitive processes in free decision-making.
{"title":"Partial awareness during voluntary endogenous decision","authors":"Benjamin Rebouillat , Nicolas Barascud , Sid Kouider","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103769","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103769","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Despite our feeling of control over decisions, our ability to consciously access choices before execution remains debated. Recent research reveals prospective access to intention to act, allowing potential vetoes of impending decisions. However, whether the content of impending decision can be accessed remain debated. Here we track neural signals during participants’ early deliberation in free decisions. Participants chose freely between two options but sometimes had to reject their current decision just before execution. The initially preferred option, tracked in real time, significantly predicts the upcoming choice, but remain mostly outside of conscious awareness. Participants often display overconfidence in their access to this content. Instead, confidence is associated with a neural marker of self-initiated decision, indicating a qualitative confusion in the confidence evaluation process. Our results challenge the notion of complete agency over choices, suggesting inflated awareness of forthcoming decisions and providing insights into metacognitive processes in free decision-making.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142438340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103768
Ling Lee Chong, Diane M. Beck
Does the likelihood of us experiencing inattentional blindness depend on whether the scenes are statistically regular (e.g., probable) or not? Previous studies have shown that observers find it harder to perceive real-world statistical irregularities, such as improbable (statistically irregular) scenes (e.g., scenes unlikely to take place in the real world) as opposed to probable (statistically regular) scenes. Moreover, high inattentional blindness rates have been observed for improbable stimuli (e.g., a gorilla on a college campus). However, no one has directly compared noticing rates for probable and improbable scenes. Here we ask if people are more likely to experience inattentional blindness for improbable than probable scenes. In two large-scale experiments in which one group of participants is presented, on the critical trial, with a probable scene and the other group with an improbable scene, we observed higher rates of inattention blindness for participants receiving improbable scenes than those receiving probable scenes.
{"title":"Real-world Statistical Regularity Impacts Inattentional Blindness","authors":"Ling Lee Chong, Diane M. Beck","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103768","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103768","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Does the likelihood of us experiencing inattentional blindness depend on whether the scenes are statistically regular (e.g., probable) or not? Previous studies have shown that observers find it harder to perceive real-world statistical irregularities, such as improbable (statistically irregular) scenes (e.g., scenes unlikely to take place in the real world) as opposed to probable (statistically regular) scenes. Moreover, high inattentional blindness rates have been observed for improbable stimuli (e.g., a gorilla on a college campus). However, no one has directly compared noticing rates for probable and improbable scenes. Here we ask if people are more likely to experience inattentional blindness for improbable than probable scenes. In two large-scale experiments in which one group of participants is presented, on the critical trial, with a probable scene and the other group with an improbable scene, we observed higher rates of inattention blindness for participants receiving improbable scenes than those receiving probable scenes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142512683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-01DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103761
Jeffrey A. Gibbons , Matthew Traversa , Lauren Chadwick , Emily Peterson , Richard Walker
The fading affect bias (FAB) is the faster fading of unpleasant affect than pleasant affect for autobiographical event memories, and it is considered a healthy coping mechanism because it is positively related to healthy measures (e.g., self-esteem and positive PANAS), whereas it is negatively related to unhealthy measures (e.g., psychological distress and negative PANAS). Some researchers suggest that Deese-Roediger McDermott (DRM) critical lure false memories for words are conceptually equivalent to false memories for autobiographical event memories, which has not been examined. Based on the finding that false autobiographical event memories negatively predict FAB, the current study tested if false DRM word memories would negatively predict FAB for autobiographical event memories, which would demonstrate support for the conceptual equivalence of DRM memories and autobiographical event memories. We found that three measures of false word recall positively predicted FAB, which is a result that is contrary to prior findings and the contention that DRM false memories for words are conceptually the same as autobiographical event memories.
情感消退偏差(FAB)是指自传性事件记忆中不愉快情感的消退速度快于愉快情感的消退速度,它被认为是一种健康的应对机制,因为它与健康的测量指标(如自尊和积极的 PANAS)呈正相关,而与不健康的测量指标(如心理困扰和消极的 PANAS)呈负相关。一些研究人员认为,Deese-Roediger McDermott(DRM)临界引诱词的虚假记忆在概念上等同于自传体事件记忆的虚假记忆,但这一观点尚未得到研究。基于虚假自传事件记忆对 FAB 负向预测的发现,本研究测试了虚假 DRM 单词记忆是否会对自传事件记忆的 FAB 负向预测,这将证明 DRM 记忆和自传事件记忆在概念上等同。我们发现,对虚假词语回忆的三种测量方法对 FAB 有正向预测作用,这一结果与之前的研究结果以及 DRM 虚假词语记忆在概念上与自传体事件记忆相同的论点相反。
{"title":"Relation between Deese-Roediger-Mcdermott recall measures of false memory and the fading affect bias","authors":"Jeffrey A. Gibbons , Matthew Traversa , Lauren Chadwick , Emily Peterson , Richard Walker","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103761","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103761","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The fading affect bias (FAB) is the faster fading of unpleasant affect than pleasant affect for autobiographical event memories, and it is considered a healthy coping mechanism because it is positively related to healthy measures (e.g., self-esteem and positive PANAS), whereas it is negatively related to unhealthy measures (e.g., psychological distress and negative PANAS). Some researchers suggest that Deese-Roediger McDermott (DRM) critical lure false memories for words are conceptually equivalent to false memories for autobiographical event memories, which has not been examined. Based on the finding that false autobiographical event memories negatively predict FAB, the current study tested if false DRM word memories would negatively predict FAB for autobiographical event memories, which would demonstrate support for the conceptual equivalence of DRM memories and autobiographical event memories. We found that three measures of false word recall positively predicted FAB, which is a result that is contrary to prior findings and the contention that DRM false memories for words are conceptually the same as autobiographical event memories.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142376222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current study asked whether impoverished peripheral vision led to perception immune from word-based semantic influences. We leveraged a peripheral sound-induced flash illusion. In each trial, two or three Mandarin characters were flashed quickly in the periphery with number-congruent or -incongruent beeps. We first successfully replicated the original illusions, showing auditory dominance. For example, when three characters were presented together with two beeps, the observer reported perceiving only two characters. Similarly, an additional beep induced an illusory visual percept. Crucially, when the three characters formed a meaningful word, the lack of a concurrent beep suppressed the awareness to a greater extent. A separate experiment replicated the effect on participants who were unable to recognize the words. When the reading was disrupted by reversing the presentation order, the effect disappeared. These findings demonstrate the capacity of our visual system to extract peripheral linguistic information without conscious word recognition.
{"title":"Implicit semantics gates visual awareness","authors":"Shao-Min Hung , Daw-An Wu , Po-Jang Hsieh , Shinsuke Shimojo","doi":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103771","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.concog.2024.103771","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The current study asked whether impoverished peripheral vision led to perception immune from word-based semantic influences. We leveraged a peripheral sound-induced flash illusion. In each trial, two or three Mandarin characters were flashed quickly in the periphery with number-congruent or -incongruent beeps. We first successfully replicated the original illusions, showing auditory dominance. For example, when three characters were presented together with two beeps, the observer reported perceiving only two characters. Similarly, an additional beep induced an illusory visual percept. Crucially, when the three characters formed a meaningful word, the lack of a concurrent beep suppressed the awareness to a greater extent. A separate experiment replicated the effect on participants who were unable to recognize the words. When the reading was disrupted by reversing the presentation order, the effect disappeared. These findings demonstrate the capacity of our visual system to extract peripheral linguistic information without conscious word recognition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51358,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness and Cognition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142480403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}