Clientelism, Brokers Dominance, and Rigged Election: A Process of Authoritarian Democracy in Bangladesh

Abstract

It is often assumed that power is exerted through patron–client exchanges in Bangladesh. These patron–client relationships are dispersed and multifaceted, kept together by moral closeness and tenderness. The incumbent government of Bangladesh rigged the last 2014 and 2018 national elections through the clientelist process. In Bangladesh, clientelism has become an art form that encompasses a wide variety of illegal electoral strategies and crimes. Brokers have a crucial part to play in this process because they are responsible for controlling patron–client interactions. Even while clientelism is thought of as an investment in public goods for the underprivileged, it has been demonstrating severe democratic degradation causes in countries that are still in the process of creating their democracies. This study explores how clientelism, broker dominance, and particularly the patron–client situation led Bangladesh to transition from a two-party or multiparty democratic state to a one-party dominant state that is flavored with authoritarian democracy. It also demonstrates how this has led to the emergence of a society in which free and fair election is an illusion.