{"title":"Book Review: People, Politics and Purpose: Biography and Canadian Political History","authors":"P. M. Boehm","doi":"10.1177/00207020231198035","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"work could benefit from a few concepts from Political Science. While historians are typically allergic to causal analysis, certain analytical possibilities should not be elided so easily. Finally, we come to the keyword in the title: “confronting” SaddamHussein. In the conclusion, Leffler makes a provocative argument that Bush “decided to confront Hussein— not invade Iraq.” However, the distinction between “confrontingHussein” and “not invading Iraq” goes unexplained. Moreover, it carries major implications that raise more questions than Leffler answers. When did confronting Hussein become invading Iraq? When did invasion become inevitable? Why did the US invade Iraq in March 2003 and not some other time? Did Bush take the prospect of war seriously? If the intention was to confront Saddam, and not invade Iraq, then what accounts for invasion? This opens the possibility that invading happened by accident, or at least, for reasons that are not explained in this book. Clearly, Confronting Saddam Hussein will not be the last word on the Iraq War. Twenty years after the event, it stands as a valuable reminder of what we know and of what remains unknown.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"481 - 483"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231198035","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
work could benefit from a few concepts from Political Science. While historians are typically allergic to causal analysis, certain analytical possibilities should not be elided so easily. Finally, we come to the keyword in the title: “confronting” SaddamHussein. In the conclusion, Leffler makes a provocative argument that Bush “decided to confront Hussein— not invade Iraq.” However, the distinction between “confrontingHussein” and “not invading Iraq” goes unexplained. Moreover, it carries major implications that raise more questions than Leffler answers. When did confronting Hussein become invading Iraq? When did invasion become inevitable? Why did the US invade Iraq in March 2003 and not some other time? Did Bush take the prospect of war seriously? If the intention was to confront Saddam, and not invade Iraq, then what accounts for invasion? This opens the possibility that invading happened by accident, or at least, for reasons that are not explained in this book. Clearly, Confronting Saddam Hussein will not be the last word on the Iraq War. Twenty years after the event, it stands as a valuable reminder of what we know and of what remains unknown.