{"title":"Can authorities curtail falsified trade & investment data that hide capital movements? Evidence from flows between BRICS and the USA","authors":"Subhasish Das , Amit K. Biswas","doi":"10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.09.001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Usually developing and transitional countries are characterised by foreign exchange and capital scarcities and hence resort to stringent trade and capital control<span> policies. This might become counterproductive and provide incentives to the international traders and investors to go for corrupt practices. This paper investigates how do these tight policies might encourage illegal or hidden capital movements across borders. By presenting both a theoretical and an empirical analysis, where traders and investors rationally misreport to evade stringent trade and investment barriers, we first show that illegal capital outflow takes place through trade misreporting and interestingly, export and import misreporting are cointegrated. Secondly and more importantly illegal capital inflow might take place through overreporting of FDI values and illegal capital outflow and inflow are cointegrated too. Based on the thorough investigation of the BRICS – USA bilateral trade and FDI data, we propose that a less regulated trade and investment regime might benefit these countries more as tight and restrictive policies seem to be self-defeating. Our study comes up with policy conclusions that might minimise the cross-border illegal capital movements.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48015,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policy Modeling","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Policy Modeling","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0161893823000996","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Usually developing and transitional countries are characterised by foreign exchange and capital scarcities and hence resort to stringent trade and capital control policies. This might become counterproductive and provide incentives to the international traders and investors to go for corrupt practices. This paper investigates how do these tight policies might encourage illegal or hidden capital movements across borders. By presenting both a theoretical and an empirical analysis, where traders and investors rationally misreport to evade stringent trade and investment barriers, we first show that illegal capital outflow takes place through trade misreporting and interestingly, export and import misreporting are cointegrated. Secondly and more importantly illegal capital inflow might take place through overreporting of FDI values and illegal capital outflow and inflow are cointegrated too. Based on the thorough investigation of the BRICS – USA bilateral trade and FDI data, we propose that a less regulated trade and investment regime might benefit these countries more as tight and restrictive policies seem to be self-defeating. Our study comes up with policy conclusions that might minimise the cross-border illegal capital movements.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Policy Modeling is published by Elsevier for the Society for Policy Modeling to provide a forum for analysis and debate concerning international policy issues. The journal addresses questions of critical import to the world community as a whole, and it focuses upon the economic, social, and political interdependencies between national and regional systems. This implies concern with international policies for the promotion of a better life for all human beings and, therefore, concentrates on improved methodological underpinnings for dealing with these problems.