Aristotle and Hume on the Idea of Natural Necessity

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2019-04-01 DOI:10.5840/studneoar20191627
David Botting
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Abstract

There is a tension in scholarship about Aristotle’s philosophy, especially his philosophy of science, between empiricist readings and rationalist readings. A prime site of conflict is Posterior Analytics II.19 where Aristotle, after having said that we know the first principles by induction suddenly says that we know them by nous. Those taking the rationalist side find in nous something like a faculty of “intuition” and are led to the conclusion that by “induction” Aristotle has some kind of idea of “intuitive induction”. Those taking the empiricist side resist this temptation but then struggle to explain how we can know first principles by induction and usually end by relegating induction to a mere subsidiary role; well-known problems of induction, with which Aristotle shows some familiarity, militate against taking anything we learn from induction to be a first principle or even certain. I am on the side of the empiricists, and would like to adopt as a methodological assumption that no concept of intuition occurs in any of Aristotle’s works. That is a far more ambitious project than I am attempting here, however. Here, I want to defend a non-intuitive, enumerative kind of induction against a raft of criticisms raised against it in the collection Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Approaches to Induction (Biondi & Groarke 2014). I want to defend the position that Hume and Aristotle have basically the same conception of induction and of what it can and cannot do. What it cannot do, for both, is prove natural necessities. A paradigm shift is neither necessary nor desirable for a proper understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy of science. Aristotle is still the empiricist philosopher we all thought he was before reading Posterior Analytics II.19
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亚里士多德与休谟论自然必然性
亚里士多德哲学,尤其是他的科学哲学,在学术界存在着经验主义解读和理性主义解读之间的张力。冲突的一个主要地点是后验分析II。19亚里士多德在说过我们通过归纳法了解第一原理后,突然说我们通过理性了解它们。那些站在理性主义一边的人在理性中发现了某种“直觉”的能力,并得出结论,通过“归纳”,亚里士多德有某种“直觉归纳”的概念。那些站在经验主义一边的人抵制住了这种诱惑,但随后很难解释我们如何通过归纳法来了解第一原理,并且通常以将归纳法降级为一种附属作用而告终;众所周知的归纳法问题,亚里士多德对此表现出一定的熟悉,不利于将我们从归纳法中学到的任何东西作为第一原则,甚至是确定的。我站在经验主义者一边,并希望将亚里士多德的任何作品中都没有直觉的概念作为一种方法论假设。然而,这是一个比我在这里尝试的更雄心勃勃的项目。在这里,我想为一种非直觉的、列举式的归纳法辩护,反对《转变范式:归纳法的替代方法》(Biondi&Groarke,2014)一书中对其提出的大量批评。我想捍卫这样一种观点,即休谟和亚里士多德对归纳法以及归纳法能做什么和不能做什么有着基本相同的概念。对两者来说,归纳法不能做的是证明自然的必要性。范式转换对于正确理解亚里士多德的科学哲学既不必要也不可取。亚里士多德仍然是我们在阅读《后验分析II》之前所认为的经验主义哲学家。19
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来源期刊
Studia Neoaristotelica
Studia Neoaristotelica Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.30
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期刊介绍: Studia Neoaristotelica is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal devoted to the promotion of Aristotelian philosophy broadly conceived, drawing on the rich legacy of the scholastic tradition and contemporary analytical metaphysics. Special emphasis is placed on the most advanced forms of scholastic thought that emerged during the Renaissance and Baroque periods. Our vision is to work toward a philosophical synthesis of analytic and scholastic methods and ideas, providing a contribution to Christian philosophy as well as wider secular thought. The journal is published by Editiones Scholasticae and the University of South Bohemia Faculty of Theology.
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