Questioning the Teleology of the Central State in Republican China

Pub Date : 2022-01-06 DOI:10.1353/tcc.2022.0016
Xavier Paulès, David Serfass
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Abstract

No doubt the expansion of the reach of the state can be considered one of the prominent features of the twentieth century.1 Many studies have described this process in Western Europe and beyond.2 In the case of China, however, there is a marked tendency in the historiography to assume that, except for the Qing dynasty’s lastditch efforts to modernize from 1901–1911 with the New Policies (新政 xinzheng) reforms and a short-lived attempt during the Nanjing Decade (1928–1937), the first half of the twentieth century represented, for the most part, a discontinuation in the process of state building. It was in order to question this assumption that we organized a conference on “State-Building through Political Disunity in Republican China,” held in Paris at EHESS (École des hautes études en sciences sociales) in September 2018. The idea was to target the Republican period (1912–1949) as one of critical importance in the process of state building in modern China. A key aspect of the Republican period, in fact, is political fragmentation. None of the central governments asserting themselves and (mostly) recognized as such—the Beiyang governments (1912–1928) and the subsequent Nationalist government (1928–1949)—was in a position to control China Proper, let alone the whole territory formerly dominated by the Qing dynasty. Moreover, these central governments faced many formidable challengers, including regional warlord and Communist regimes as well as pro-Japanese governments. Contemporaries lamented the lack of effective centralization because they saw political disunity as a decisive obstacle on the road toward a modern and powerful China capable of (among other things) renegotiating the “unequal treaties” as Meiji Japan had done. This Republican concern for disunity and its negative effect on state building tends to persist among today’s specialists on Republican China (regardless of nationality). Admittedly, scholars have demonstrated that the Beiyang governments, despite their
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对民国中央国家目的论的质疑
毫无疑问,国家权力范围的扩大可以被认为是20世纪的显著特征之一许多研究已经在西欧和其他地区描述了这一过程然而,就中国而言,史学上有一种明显的倾向,认为除了清朝在1901-1911年推行的新政改革和南京十年(1928-1937)期间的短暂尝试之外,20世纪上半叶在很大程度上代表了国家建设进程的中断。正是为了质疑这一假设,我们于2018年9月在巴黎的EHESS (École des hautes cassides en sciences sociales)组织了一场关于“共和中国通过政治分裂进行国家建设”的会议。这一思想是将民国时期(1912-1949)作为近代中国国家建设过程中至关重要的一个时期。事实上,共和时期的一个关键方面是政治分裂。没有一个中央政府声称自己(大部分)是这样认为的——北洋政府(1912-1928)和随后的国民政府(1928-1949)——能够控制整个中国,更不用说以前由清朝统治的整个领土了。此外,这些中央政府面临着许多强大的挑战者,包括地区军阀和共产主义政权以及亲日政府。同时代的人哀叹缺乏有效的中央集权,因为他们认为政治不统一是通往现代强大中国道路上的决定性障碍,中国有能力(除其他外)像明治日本那样重新谈判“不平等条约”。这种共和党人对分裂的担忧及其对国家建设的负面影响,在今天研究共和中国的专家(无论国籍)中往往持续存在。不可否认,学者们已经证明了北洋政府,尽管他们
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