The Ontological Distinction between Persons and Their Bodies

M. R. Tahmasbi
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Abstract

Abstract Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory of persons explains the relationship between persons and their bodies. Baker’s theory can explain the ontological status of persons. However, her explanation of the distinction between persons and their bodies faces a problem. In this paper, first, I show that her account, in fact, does not amount to a real distinction between persons and their bodies. Then, by discussing the notion of ‘derivatively having property,’ I propose a notion of constitution which is compatible with the idea that persons and their bodies are, ontologically speaking, distinct entities. This notion of constitution helps us to avoid both the problem of too many minds and the problem of substance dualism.
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人与身体的本体论区别
林恩·鲁德尔·贝克的人格构成理论解释了人与身体的关系。贝克的理论可以解释人的本体论地位。然而,她对人和身体之间区别的解释面临一个问题。在这篇论文中,首先,我表明她的描述,事实上,并不等于一个真正的区分人与他们的身体。然后,通过讨论“衍生地拥有财产”的概念,我提出了一个宪法的概念,这个概念与个人和他们的身体在本体论上是不同的实体的观点是相容的。这个构成的概念帮助我们避免了太多思想的问题和物质二元论的问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
期刊最新文献
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