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Frontmatter 头版头条
Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-frontmatter2
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引用次数: 0
On Emergence, Again 再次谈紧急情况
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0017
F. Ferrari, M. Bickhard
Abstract The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we are interested in assessing the validity of one version of Kim’s argument against genuine higher level causation. Second, we discuss Wilson’s proposal to consider a weaker notion of emergence as genuinely metaphysical and compatible with Non-Reductive Physicalism. Our conclusion is that both proposals fail: the first in preempting genuine (strong) emergent causation, whereas the second in ensuring a genuinely metaphysical status to weak emergence. After all, Wilson’s proposal strongly depends on the success of Kim’s, not only because it takes it as valid but, also, because in pursuing its own weaker model it shares the presuppositions that led Kim’s to failure. At the end of the day, Wilson’s conception of genuine weak emergence either breaks causal closure or is merely stipulative, namely confined at the descriptive level.
本文的目的是双重的。首先,我们感兴趣的是评估一个版本的金的论点反对真正的高层次因果关系的有效性。其次,我们讨论威尔逊的建议,考虑一个较弱的浮现概念是真正形而上学的,并与非还原物理主义兼容。我们的结论是,这两种建议都是失败的:第一个建议在抢占真正的(强)涌现的因果关系,而第二个建议在确保一个真正形而上学的地位,以弱涌现。毕竟,威尔逊的提议在很大程度上依赖于金正日的成功,不仅因为它认为金正日的提议是有效的,还因为它在追求自己较弱的模式时,分享了导致金正日模式失败的前提。说到底,威尔逊关于真正的弱涌现的概念要么打破了因果封闭性,要么仅仅是规定性的,即局限于描述层面。
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引用次数: 0
Qua-Objects, (Non-)Derivative Properties and the Consistency of Hylomorphism 拟对象、(非)导数性质与Hylomorphism的一致性
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0036
Marta Campdelacreu, Sergi Oms
Abstract Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact.
摘要想象一下,一个雕塑家用一块粘土来塑造一座雕像。Hylomorphism声称雕像和粘土块是两个不同的并置物体,具有不同的形式,尽管它们共享相同的物质。近来,关于亚纯理论的一致性要求有一些讨论。在本文中,我们关注Maegan-Fairchild提出的一个论点,根据该论点,亚纯性的极小版本是不一致的。我们认为,这个论点是不合理的,或者,充其量,它只是指出了hymorphist理论的一个众所周知的问题。此外,我们还探讨了这一事实的一些普遍后果。
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引用次数: 0
Seizing the World: From Concepts to Reality 抢占世界:从概念到现实
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-04 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0031
David Hommen
Abstract In this essay, I shall defend a transcendental argument for epistemological realism: the view that mind-independent yet cognitively accessible entities exist. The proposed argument reasons from the fact that we are conceptual creatures to the existence of a knowable outer world as a condition of the possibility of such creatures. I first lay down my general approach to concepts and conceptualization, according to which concepts are rules that agents follow in their cognitive activities. I go on to explicate the peculiar normative nature of rules and rule-following, from which I extract, following Wittgensteinian considerations, an intractable problem for any idealist account of concept possession. I argue that the very possibility of conceptualizing requires the existence of external objects that enable the cognizer to regulate their use of concepts, and close with some remarks on the resultant nature and scope of metaphysical knowledge.
摘要在这篇文章中,我将为认识论实在论的一个先验论点辩护:即存在独立于心智但可认知的实体的观点。所提出的论点的理由是,我们是概念上的生物,而存在一个可知的外部世界是这种生物存在的可能性的条件。我首先阐述了我对概念和概念化的一般方法,根据这些方法,概念是主体在认知活动中遵循的规则。我接着阐述了规则和规则遵循的特殊规范性,根据维特根斯坦的考虑,我从中提取了任何唯心主义者对概念拥有的解释都难以解决的问题。我认为,概念化的可能性本身就需要外部对象的存在,这些外部对象使认知者能够调节他们对概念的使用,并在结束时对由此产生的形而上学知识的性质和范围发表一些评论。
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引用次数: 0
Time Travel and Collisions 时间旅行和碰撞
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0020
C. Maslen
Abstract This paper focuses on problems for time travel that specifically concern continuous time-travel to the past, problems to do with potential collisions with past obstacles such as former time-slices of the time traveler herself. These problems have not been discussed nearly as much as other questions about time travel, such as the Grandfather Paradox. Here I focus on discussions by Bernstein, Dowe, Grey and Le Poidevin. After examination, I conclude that only the problems of turning around in time have any merit and present a new proposal of my own for turning around in time without collisions. I assume a Lewisian framework throughout.
摘要:本文主要研究时间旅行的问题,特别是涉及到过去的连续时间旅行的问题,以及与过去障碍物(如时间旅行者自己以前的时间片)的潜在碰撞问题。这些问题还没有像其他关于时间旅行的问题,如祖父悖论那样被讨论得那么多。在这里,我主要关注伯恩斯坦、杜威、格雷和勒普伊德文的讨论。经过研究,我得出结论,只有在时间上转弯的问题有任何优点,并提出了我自己的一个没有碰撞的时间上转弯的新建议。我假设一个刘易斯的框架贯穿始终。
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引用次数: 0
On Moving Past the ABCs 关于超越ABC
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0012
Natalja Deng
Abstract Craig Callender’s What Makes Time Special? (OUP 2017) advocates and practices an innovative, thoroughly interdisciplinary approach to philosophical questions about time and temporal features of our lives. Grappling with it is of intrinsic philosophical interest; it is also part of responding to the methodological invitation the book issues to philosophers of time. This paper is motivated by the wish to clarify WMTS’s philosophical underpinnings. The main claim of the paper is that WMTS relies on an ambiguity between rejecting the A-theory versus B-theory debate, and endorsing a position within that debate. This ambiguity leads to a somewhat unstable position on how a key feature of manifest time, namely our sense of time as flowing, arises from physical time. The paper ends with a suggestion for how to resolve the ambiguity, in a way that is in line with the gist of Callender’s overall vision for the field.
摘要克雷格·卡伦德的《是什么让时间变得特别?(OUP 2017)倡导并实践一种创新的、彻底跨学科的方法来解决关于我们生活的时间和时间特征的哲学问题。抓住它具有内在的哲学意义;这也是对该书向时间哲学家发出的方法论邀请的回应。本文旨在阐明WMTS的哲学基础。该论文的主要主张是,WMTS依赖于拒绝A理论与B理论辩论之间的模糊性,以及支持该辩论中的立场。这种模糊性导致了对显时间的一个关键特征,即我们对时间流动的感觉,是如何从物理时间产生的,有点不稳定。本文最后提出了如何解决歧义的建议,这符合Callender对该领域的总体愿景。
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引用次数: 0
Branching with a Humean Face 用休谟的脸分支
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0040
L. Wronski
Abstract This paper investigates the prospects of developing a branching modal framework while keeping with the spirit of Humean Supervenience. It is argued that such an approach is bound to face hard problems regarding haecceitism and the notion of recombination. Possible directions for future philosophical developments of branching frameworks are suggested.
摘要本文探讨了在保持休谟监督精神的前提下发展分支模态框架的前景。有人认为,这样的做法必然会面临关于种族主义和重组概念的棘手问题。提出了分支框架未来哲学发展的可能方向。
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引用次数: 0
Why Mereological Essentialism Applies to Mereological Aggregates 为什么纯粹本质论适用于纯粹聚集体
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0023
J. Moreland
Abstract This article’s purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls “Serious Metaphysics” and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis.
本文的目的是为将普通大小的物理对象描述为狭义聚合体(MAs)进行辩护,澄清狭义聚合体的本体论是什么,并说明如果我们采用弗兰克·杰克逊(Frank Jackson)所说的“严肃形而上学”(Serious Metaphysics),拒绝将本体论扩展到物理和化学遗留给我们的东西之外,为什么狭义本质主义(ME)适用于似乎无处不在的狭义聚合体。为了实现这一目标,首先,我澄清了一些背景问题,这些问题为接下来的内容提供了信息,并确定了与当代对ME的矛盾心理相关的某些约束。其次,我提出了胡塞尔气象学的入门,它提供了一个更好的部分和整体的说明,而不是在前一节中确定的不充分的方法。第三,我将为ME辩护,认为它是提供ma本体论解释的正确方法。最后,我将根据我的论文评价两个失败者。
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引用次数: 0
The Objective Status of Subjective Facts 主观事实的客观地位
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-04-21 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0029
H. Sankey
Abstract Some facts are objective. Some facts are subjective. Subjective facts are personal facts about individuals. It is the purpose of this short note to suggest that subjective facts are in fact objective facts about us. This applies not just to facts involving relations to entities that are independent of us, but to our tastes. It is an objective fact about us that we have the tastes that we do though there may be no objective matter of fact that our tastes reflect or fail to reflect.
摘要有些事实是客观的。有些事实是主观的。主观事实是关于个人的个人事实。这篇短文的目的是表明,主观事实实际上是关于我们的客观事实。这不仅适用于涉及与独立于我们的实体的关系的事实,也适用于我们的品味。我们有自己的品味,这是一个客观的事实,尽管我们的品味可能没有反映或没有反映这一客观事实。
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引用次数: 0
The Holotic Structure of the Ideas of Unity, Identity and Finality 统一性、同一性和最终性思想的整体结构
IF 0.2 Q3 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1515/mp-2022-0033
David Alvargonzález
Abstract In this paper, I touch on the holotic structure of the ideas of unity, identity and finality, using the word “holotic” to refer to a theory that includes both partonomic (or mereological) wholes and taxonomic (or diairological) wholes. In the second section, I expound on two classifications of wholes and two classifications of the types of parts I deem relevant to the ideas of unity, identity and finality. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss how these three ideas acquire different significance depending on the type of totalities and parts involved.
摘要在本文中,我谈到了统一性、同一性和终结性思想的整体结构,用“整体”一词来指代一种既包括部分(或单体)整体又包括分类(或二元)整体的理论。在第二节中,我阐述了整体的两种分类和我认为与统一、同一性和终结性思想相关的部分类型的两种类型。在第三节和第四节中,我讨论了这三个思想是如何根据所涉及的整体和部分的类型而获得不同的意义的。
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Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics
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