The Many Faces of SALT

IF 0.7 2区 历史学 Q1 HISTORY Journal of Cold War Studies Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1162/jcws_a_01105
R. Jervis
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Abstract

Abstract This interpretive essay explores the multiple, changing faces of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. When SALT I was being negotiated in the early 1970s, it was generally viewed as the product of contemporary arms control theory that stressed the value of crisis stability. The U.S. national security adviser at the time, Henry Kissinger, justified the talks in those terms while also positioning them as part of a broader attempt to forge a détente with the Soviet Union. But after the Cold War ended, Kissinger claimed that he had really been engaging in a holding operation to buy time for the U.S. government to rebuild support for a more assertive policy. Declassified documents reveal that he and President Richard Nixon hoped that technological innovations would yield military and political advantages. The two of them believed that previous administrations had failed to overcome dangerous military vulnerabilities and that the United States could get a better deal because the USSR was more anxious for an agreement than Nixon and Kissinger were. In the end, however, this did not prove to be the case, and SALT was little different from the sorts of policies Nixon and Kissinger had scorned. But SALT I was a centerpiece of détente and a symbol of U.S. and Soviet leaders’ recognition that each side had a legitimate interest in the other's military posture.
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SALT的多面性
摘要这篇解释性文章探讨了限制战略武器谈判的多重变化的面貌。20世纪70年代初,当SALT I谈判时,人们普遍认为它是强调危机稳定价值的当代军备控制理论的产物。当时的美国国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格(Henry Kissinger)用这些话为谈判辩护,同时也将其定位为与苏联达成缓和关系的更广泛尝试的一部分。但在冷战结束后,基辛格声称,他真的一直在参与一场控股行动,为美国政府争取时间,以重建对更强硬政策的支持。解密文件显示,他和理查德·尼克松总统希望技术创新能带来军事和政治优势。他们两人认为,前几届政府未能克服危险的军事弱点,美国可以达成更好的协议,因为苏联比尼克松和基辛格更渴望达成协议。然而,最终情况并非如此,SALT与尼克松和基辛格所蔑视的政策几乎没有什么不同。但SALT I是缓和的核心,也是美国和苏联领导人承认双方对对方军事态势都有合法利益的象征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
44
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