{"title":"Ukraine, Afghanistan and the failure of deterrence","authors":"W. Maley","doi":"10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. For this reason, it is worth unpacking some key elements of the idea of deterrence, and looking at what contributed to its failing in the case of Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":51708,"journal":{"name":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","volume":"77 1","pages":"407 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Australian Journal of International Affairs","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2219628","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine highlighted the limitations of a ‘rules-based’ international order in protecting a state’s territorial integrity in the face of threats to international peace and security resulting from the actions of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With the capacity to veto any Security Council resolution authorising ‘enforcement action’ under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, Russian leaders only had to fear the exercise under Article 51 of Ukraine’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. But Ukraine was in no position to drive Russian forces from Crimea unless supported by a great power such as the United States, and as Lawrence Freedman put it, ‘President Obama made it clear that he saw no circumstances in which the United States would use armed force in connection with this crisis’ (Freedman 2019, 106). The focus of the international response would instead be on extended deterrence of future Russian aggression. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Birnbaum et al. 2022), it became abundantly clear that Russia had not been successfully deterred from invading its western neighbour. Debate thereafter tended to focus on two points: the extent to which moves to admit Ukraine to NATO membership, anticipated by US President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, might or might not have inflamed Russian elite opinion; and the importance of building a coalition of Western states to support the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an exercise for which US President Biden on the whole received high marks. Somewhat lost in these discussions was any serious analysis of the deterrence failure that the invasion of Ukraine exposed. Yet an exploration of what deterrence means in the 21st century, and how it came to fail in the Ukrainian case, remains distinctly pertinent when one looks at other potential flashpoints such as the Middle East and East Asia. For this reason, it is worth unpacking some key elements of the idea of deterrence, and looking at what contributed to its failing in the case of Ukraine.
期刊介绍:
AJIA is the journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The Institute was established in 1933 as an independent and non-political body and its purpose is to stimulate interest in and understanding of international affairs among its members and the general public. The aim of the Australian Journal of International Affairs is to publish high quality scholarly research on international political, social, economic and legal issues, especially (but not exclusively) within the Asia-Pacific region. The journal publishes research articles, refereed review essays and commentary and provocation pieces. ''Articles'' are traditional scholarly articles. ‘Review essays’ use newly published books as the basis to thematically examine current events in International Relations. The journal also publishes commentaries and provocations which are high quality and engaging pieces of commentary, opinion and provocation in a variety of styles. The Australian Journal of International Affairs aims to analyse international issues for an Australian readership and to present Australian perspectives to readers in other countries. While seeking to stimulate interest in and understanding of international affairs, the journal does not seek to promote any particular policies or approaches. All suitable manuscripts submitted are sent to two referees in a full ''double blind'' refereeing process.