{"title":"The Distortion of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Institutional Perspective of Central–Local Government Relations","authors":"Yexin Mao","doi":"10.1177/00953997231158343","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How to explain the distortion of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is underexplored. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article proposes an institutional incentive-driven framework. Based on a case study of PPPs in China, this article finds that central–local government relationships play a crucial role in shaping PPP performance. Goal incongruence and information asymmetry lead to two types of distortion. First, PPPs become a political task for local governments to respond to higher-level governments’ needs. Second, PPPs serve as financing tools to create political achievements. These opportunistic behaviors violate the goals of the central government’s PPP policy and increase government debt risks.","PeriodicalId":47966,"journal":{"name":"Administration & Society","volume":"55 1","pages":"752 - 776"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Administration & Society","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231158343","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
How to explain the distortion of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is underexplored. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article proposes an institutional incentive-driven framework. Based on a case study of PPPs in China, this article finds that central–local government relationships play a crucial role in shaping PPP performance. Goal incongruence and information asymmetry lead to two types of distortion. First, PPPs become a political task for local governments to respond to higher-level governments’ needs. Second, PPPs serve as financing tools to create political achievements. These opportunistic behaviors violate the goals of the central government’s PPP policy and increase government debt risks.
期刊介绍：
Administration & Society seeks to further the understanding of public and human service organizations, their administrative processes, and their effect on society. The journal publishes empirically oriented research reports and theoretically specific articles that synthesize or contribute to the advancement of understanding and explanation in these fields. Of particular interest are (1) studies that analyze the effects of the introduction of administrative strategies, programs, change interventions, and training; and (2) studies of intergroup, interorganizational, and organization-environment relationships and policy processes.
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