Book Review: The 1945 Burma Campaign and the Transformation of the British Indian Army by Raymond A. Callahan and Daniel Marston

Abstract

security crises caused by the war to an end. One means to that end was armaments limitation. In the League of Nations Covenant, the member states committed themselves to match Germany’s forced disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles by disarming to the lowest level consistent with national security. Although the preparations in Geneva for the much-delayed World Disarmament Conference were complex, tedious, and slow,Webster is correct that the military experts succeeded in identifying all the technical obstacles to disarmament – even if they failed to find ways around them. That goal would of course ultimately come down to a political agreement among the great powers on a mutually acceptable distribution of land, sea, and air forces combined with a legal regime to enable collective action against ‘aggressors’, the compulsory arbitration of disputes, and perhaps some limited international supervision or control of armaments. AsWebster argues, if general disarmament had any chance of success, then the critical first step was an Anglo-French consensus. As we know, that unanimity never emerged. For Webster, the explanation for the lack of agreement lies in different conceptions of international security. France, fearful of its relative weakness in relation to Germany, needed a security commitment from London or risk cutting its forces and/or allowing Germany some measure of rearmament. For Britain, preoccupied with its globe-spanning empire, France appeared both over-armed and overbearing in Europe. Despite changes in governments and the knowledge that no British government could ever allow France to fall to a German invasion, British officials dodged every French attempt to obtain a commitment from London to assist France in the event of an unprovoked German attack in exchange for compromises on all other security issues. When the World Disarmament Conference opened in February 1932, Britain played the role of honest broker between Paris and Berlin instead of an interested party. At the same time, France proposed disarmament schemes that would perpetuate its military superiority on the continent, Germany demanded not just the right to rearm but genuine equality in military strength, the Soviet Union (cynically) proposed the total abolition of armaments, the United States somewhat naively called for a general cut to defence spending and military strength, and Italy demanded equality with France, particularly in warships. In December 1932, Britain, France, and Italy recognised Germany’s equality of rights in armaments, but by then that limited concession was too little too late. To his credit, Webster speculates as to whether London and Paris had missed an opportunity to stabilise Europe through disarmament, but does not place much weight on that implausible counterfactual. Certainly, had Britain offered France a security guarantee, then France might have been more willing to accept limited German rearmament. But by 1932 Germany’s traditional political elites had thoroughly undermined the Weimar Republic and would soon invite Adolf Hitler to become Chancellor. What Webster demonstrates in his fine book is that disarmament and security diplomacy offers historians a compelling way to explore the troubled post-1919 relationship between Britain and France, a strange alliance that would culminate in military misfortune in the summer of 1940.