UN ENSAYO CRÍTICO SOBRE LA INDEPENDENCIA/AUTONOMÍA DE LA BANCA CENTRAL SEGÚN EL PARADIGMA DOMINANTE

Abstract

La independencia del banco central se refiere a la independencia politica y operacional para lograr y mantener la estabilidad de precios. La independencia politica se justifico sobre la base que no era posible explotar la existencia de un trade-off en un mundo con agentes racionales. Los intentos de hacerlo daban lugar a un problema de inconsistencia intertemporal en la politica economica. Ademas, la hipotesis de expectativas racionales limitaba significativamente el marco de accion de los banqueros centrales. La independencia de instrumentos acabo sustentandose en los marcos de metas de inflacion explicitos o implicitos. La evidencia empirica muestra que el trade-off entre inflacion y desempleo goza de buena salud y que la inflacion disminuyo de manera generalizada en el mundo a partir de la decada de 1990, independientemente de los objetivos de la politica monetaria y marcos monetarios adoptados. Ademas, en el contexto actual, existe un claro predominio de los canales de transmision financieros y de las restricciones financieras, lo que complejiza la independencia de la banca central. A CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE INDEPENDENCE/AUTONOMY OF THE CENTRAL BANK ACCORDING TO THE DOMINANT PARADIGM ABSTRACT The independence of the central bank refers to political independence and operational independence to achieve and maintain price stability. Political independence was justified on the basis that it was not possible to exploit the existence of a trade-off in a world with rational agents. Attempts to do so led to a problem of intertemporal inconsistency in economic policy. Moreover, the rational expectations hypothesis significantly limited the framework of action of central bankers. Instrument independence, on the other hand, was based on explicit or implicit inflation targeting frameworks. Empirical evidence shows that the trade-off between inflation and unemployment is well and alive and that inflation declined widely in the 1990s regardless of monetary policy objectives and monetary frameworks adopted. Moreover, in the current context, there is a clear dominance of financial transmission channels and financial constraints that makes central bank independence a more complex issue.