The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2022-11-17 DOI:10.3390/g13060077
M. Bannikova, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
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Abstract

This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
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双代理固定顺序投票下的一致同意规则
本文研究了在一致投票机制下,延迟成本和投票顺序对代理决策的影响。具体来说,我们考虑了两个选民的秘密会议,他们通常对两个备选方案有偏好,延迟的成本,以及以下的新颖性:每个选民都有一个主观的截止日期——他/她更愿意立即就任何备选方案达成协议,而不是未来就他/她最喜欢的备选方案达成协议。我们的主要发现表明,耐心不一定是战略优势的主要特征。如果第一选民在每个阶段都是相同的,即使他/她是最没有耐心的人,他/她也会选择他/她喜欢的选择。然而,当代理交替作为每个阶段的第一个投票人时,这种第一次移动优势就消失了:在这种情况下,最耐心的投票人总是获胜。
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来源期刊
Games
Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
65
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍: Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.
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