Why Mereological Essentialism Applies to Mereological Aggregates

J. Moreland
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Abstract

Abstract This article’s purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls “Serious Metaphysics” and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis.
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为什么纯粹本质论适用于纯粹聚集体
本文的目的是为将普通大小的物理对象描述为狭义聚合体(MAs)进行辩护,澄清狭义聚合体的本体论是什么,并说明如果我们采用弗兰克·杰克逊(Frank Jackson)所说的“严肃形而上学”(Serious Metaphysics),拒绝将本体论扩展到物理和化学遗留给我们的东西之外,为什么狭义本质主义(ME)适用于似乎无处不在的狭义聚合体。为了实现这一目标,首先,我澄清了一些背景问题,这些问题为接下来的内容提供了信息,并确定了与当代对ME的矛盾心理相关的某些约束。其次,我提出了胡塞尔气象学的入门,它提供了一个更好的部分和整体的说明,而不是在前一节中确定的不充分的方法。第三,我将为ME辩护,认为它是提供ma本体论解释的正确方法。最后,我将根据我的论文评价两个失败者。
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CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
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