Villager Groups and Self-Governance in China: Power, Incentives, and Risk Prevention

Abstract

Building a modern grassroots governance system synchronized with national development has become a significant part of China’s rural revitalization strategy. To cope with the overlapping of property rights, social identities, and work and living space in China’s villages, the villager group 村民小组 has been endowed with relatively complete governance power. Regional social networks, the moral constraints of reputation in the village, and the administrative incentives provided by the government constitute the incentive structure of villager group governance. At the same time, granting group cadres official authority and social power enables them to better coordinate the relationship between state and society, safeguard the rights and interests of villagers in the group, and provide low-cost public goods through their structural position in “the last kilometer” 最后一公里. However, they may also bring about the political risk of group confrontation, the economic risk of embezzling collective assets, and the moral risk of negligence and political inertia. To ward off these risks requires strengthening the leadership of grassroots party organizations, making full use of social supervision, ensuring that cadres operate in an open and above-board fashion, and introducing the notion of the rule of law, thus forming a compound risk-prevention mechanism for grassroots power and building a solid foundation for national governance.