Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341305
Philip C. C. Huang
{"title":"“Whither the Chinese Peasant Economy?”: An Introduction","authors":"Philip C. C. Huang","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341305","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"2 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140436220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341311
Qian Forrest Zhang
This paper posits that the majority of “smallholders” in contemporary China are commodity producers who must engage in various commodity exchanges to carry out agricultural production and accomplish their social reproduction. Consequently, “smallholder” refers to a family-based economic operation model, rather than a social identity or psychological identification. Within this framework, the study focuses on the intricate relationships between smallholders, various commodity markets, and other market participants. Specifically, it examines two aspects: the relationship between smallholders and capitalized large-scale producers and other agriculture-related capital entities, and the relationship between smallholders and the commodified labor force. The paper argues that the interaction between smallholders and capitalized large-scale producers is not a zero-sum game of mutual replacement; except in certain areas, smallholders are not driven out of agricultural production by large-scale capitalized producers, but coexist and interact with them in various ways. On the other hand, smallholders heavily rely on short-term hired labor for their agricultural production, and many also become wage earners themselves, participating in the agricultural production of other producers and earning wage income. Compared to the expansion of capitalized large-scale production, the most significant challenge facing China’s smallholder economy, as this paper contends, is the intergenerational reproduction crisis brought about by the aging of the labor force and the urbanization of the younger generation.
{"title":"Smallholders in Capitalist Agriculture: Persistence and Challenges","authors":"Qian Forrest Zhang","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341311","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper posits that the majority of “smallholders” in contemporary China are commodity producers who must engage in various commodity exchanges to carry out agricultural production and accomplish their social reproduction. Consequently, “smallholder” refers to a family-based economic operation model, rather than a social identity or psychological identification. Within this framework, the study focuses on the intricate relationships between smallholders, various commodity markets, and other market participants. Specifically, it examines two aspects: the relationship between smallholders and capitalized large-scale producers and other agriculture-related capital entities, and the relationship between smallholders and the commodified labor force. The paper argues that the interaction between smallholders and capitalized large-scale producers is not a zero-sum game of mutual replacement; except in certain areas, smallholders are not driven out of agricultural production by large-scale capitalized producers, but coexist and interact with them in various ways. On the other hand, smallholders heavily rely on short-term hired labor for their agricultural production, and many also become wage earners themselves, participating in the agricultural production of other producers and earning wage income. Compared to the expansion of capitalized large-scale production, the most significant challenge facing China’s smallholder economy, as this paper contends, is the intergenerational reproduction crisis brought about by the aging of the labor force and the urbanization of the younger generation.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"63 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140436907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341307
Yiyuan Chen
Taking the case of the agricultural mechanization service industry as an example, this study discusses the dynamics of the transformation of China’s agricultural contracting service industry in the context of the scaling-up of agricultural production, and how the transformation is reshaping small-scale household farming in grain production. With the accelerated growth of farmland transfer, large-scale agricultural producers have been emerging rapidly in different parts of China in the past years. Since their demand for agricultural contracting services is different from that of small-scale household producers, the scaling-up of agricultural production has promoted the scaling-up of agricultural contracting services. Meanwhile, the capital surplus in the agricultural machinery manufacturing industry has created three consequences simultaneously: the excess supply of agricultural mechanization services, the acceleration of agricultural machinery renewal, and the rising cost of machinery purchases. The interactions of these three factors not only raised the threshold of the agricultural machinery service industry, which makes it difficult for part-time service providers to survive market competition, but also shortened the time window for machinery service provision, which makes it difficult for large-scale agricultural producers to balance land operation and machinery service provision. Consequently, large-scale agricultural machinery service organizations are continuously replacing those small-scale part-time service providers. During this process, small-scale household producers engaged in grain production are faced with increasing risks of being excluded from farming, both directly and indirectly, as it is difficult for small producers to deal with large service organizations, and the small-scale part-time service providers that used to serve them are continually being replaced.
{"title":"The Scaling-up of Agricultural Mechanization Services and the Re-shaping of Small-Scale Household Farming in China","authors":"Yiyuan Chen","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341307","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Taking the case of the agricultural mechanization service industry as an example, this study discusses the dynamics of the transformation of China’s agricultural contracting service industry in the context of the scaling-up of agricultural production, and how the transformation is reshaping small-scale household farming in grain production. With the accelerated growth of farmland transfer, large-scale agricultural producers have been emerging rapidly in different parts of China in the past years. Since their demand for agricultural contracting services is different from that of small-scale household producers, the scaling-up of agricultural production has promoted the scaling-up of agricultural contracting services. Meanwhile, the capital surplus in the agricultural machinery manufacturing industry has created three consequences simultaneously: the excess supply of agricultural mechanization services, the acceleration of agricultural machinery renewal, and the rising cost of machinery purchases. The interactions of these three factors not only raised the threshold of the agricultural machinery service industry, which makes it difficult for part-time service providers to survive market competition, but also shortened the time window for machinery service provision, which makes it difficult for large-scale agricultural producers to balance land operation and machinery service provision. Consequently, large-scale agricultural machinery service organizations are continuously replacing those small-scale part-time service providers. During this process, small-scale household producers engaged in grain production are faced with increasing risks of being excluded from farming, both directly and indirectly, as it is difficult for small producers to deal with large service organizations, and the small-scale part-time service providers that used to serve them are continually being replaced.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"42 02","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140437477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341309
Tuan Yang
Peasants often face difficulties in accessing markets and require state support and assistance. The rights granted by the state to rural areas and peasants have historically been difficult to implement effectively, leading to a substantial disparity between rural practices and national policies. This paper focuses on the 20-year reform journey of Zhanqi Village in Sichuan Province, showcasing how a new type of collective economy under the market system can serve as a bridge between the state and peasants. This approach addresses crucial issues such as shared prosperity, income, employment, and security for peasants, enhancing their sense of belonging. The study explores the characteristics of this new collective economy, emphasizing the interdependence and coexistence of collective and individual efforts, forming a public-private amalgamation. It delves into various aspects, including its strategic positioning, non-profit attributes, risk absorption, intermediary role, and the holographic organizational traits related to party involvement. The paper advocates for an integrated, multidisciplinary methodology to tackle yet-to-be-resolved practical challenges, contributing to the foundational understanding and development of China’s rural collectives and collective economy.
{"title":"Connecting Small Peasants with Large Markets: The Need for a New Type of Rural Collective Economy – a Case Study of Zhanqi Village","authors":"Tuan Yang","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341309","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Peasants often face difficulties in accessing markets and require state support and assistance. The rights granted by the state to rural areas and peasants have historically been difficult to implement effectively, leading to a substantial disparity between rural practices and national policies. This paper focuses on the 20-year reform journey of Zhanqi Village in Sichuan Province, showcasing how a new type of collective economy under the market system can serve as a bridge between the state and peasants. This approach addresses crucial issues such as shared prosperity, income, employment, and security for peasants, enhancing their sense of belonging. The study explores the characteristics of this new collective economy, emphasizing the interdependence and coexistence of collective and individual efforts, forming a public-private amalgamation. It delves into various aspects, including its strategic positioning, non-profit attributes, risk absorption, intermediary role, and the holographic organizational traits related to party involvement. The paper advocates for an integrated, multidisciplinary methodology to tackle yet-to-be-resolved practical challenges, contributing to the foundational understanding and development of China’s rural collectives and collective economy.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140436164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341308
Ouyang Jing
“Informality” and “semiformality” are the primary characteristics of minimalist governance. The operation of minimalist governance assumes a boundary between state and society and some amount of autonomous space between them at the ground level. Whether in a traditional or modern form, minimalist governance stands in contrast to the formal, hierarchical bureaucracy of the state. Minimalism is a pragmatic approach to governance tailored to local conditions, a form of semiformal or informal government that emphasizes operational effectiveness over elaborate bureaucratic procedures. Since minimalist governance does not rely entirely on the hierarchical power of the state apparatus, this semiformal approach is simple and effective, hence its “minimalist” appearance. The key to solving the problem of formalism at the basic level of government lies in managing the relationship between “a thousand threads above” and “a single needle below.” Autonomy and self-governance must be granted to the basic level of the government so that party committees may fulfill their integrative political functions and their role in minimalist governance. Ultimately, this will allow the “needle” of grassroots organizations to connect with “a thousand threads above” while also penetrating deeply into local society. There is significant practical and theoretical importance in understanding the uniqueness of Chinese-style modernization, and the modernization of rural governance, from the perspective of “social foundations,” but to achieve this Chinese-style modernization we must learn from the West and from China’s own traditional and contemporary experiences.
{"title":"What Is Minimalist Governance?","authors":"Ouyang Jing","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341308","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000“Informality” and “semiformality” are the primary characteristics of minimalist governance. The operation of minimalist governance assumes a boundary between state and society and some amount of autonomous space between them at the ground level. Whether in a traditional or modern form, minimalist governance stands in contrast to the formal, hierarchical bureaucracy of the state. Minimalism is a pragmatic approach to governance tailored to local conditions, a form of semiformal or informal government that emphasizes operational effectiveness over elaborate bureaucratic procedures. Since minimalist governance does not rely entirely on the hierarchical power of the state apparatus, this semiformal approach is simple and effective, hence its “minimalist” appearance. The key to solving the problem of formalism at the basic level of government lies in managing the relationship between “a thousand threads above” and “a single needle below.” Autonomy and self-governance must be granted to the basic level of the government so that party committees may fulfill their integrative political functions and their role in minimalist governance. Ultimately, this will allow the “needle” of grassroots organizations to connect with “a thousand threads above” while also penetrating deeply into local society. There is significant practical and theoretical importance in understanding the uniqueness of Chinese-style modernization, and the modernization of rural governance, from the perspective of “social foundations,” but to achieve this Chinese-style modernization we must learn from the West and from China’s own traditional and contemporary experiences.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"34 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140435746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-23DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341310
Zhanshuo Li
Formalist legal and economic theories axiomatically assume the “rational economic man” and the “inevitable optimal resource allocation by perfectly competitive markets,” thereby justifying the ownership of corporate entities by the holders of capital assets. Professional cooperatives, guided by this formalist logic, predominantly serve the interests of capitalized large-scale peasants. In contrast, the organizational practices from mutual aid to comprehensive cooperation during the Chinese revolutionary period reveal an alternative possibility diverging from formalist logic. This alternative centers on community-based rationality of small-scale peasant households, promoting agricultural development by enhancing resource use efficiency through community mutual aid among smallholders to meet their collective production and living needs. This substantivist logic, grounded in mutual aid practices, can also provide direction for integrating small-scale peasant households into large markets in the contemporary context.
{"title":"Peasant Agency and Community Mutual Aid: An Alternative to Capital and Market Dominance","authors":"Zhanshuo Li","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341310","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Formalist legal and economic theories axiomatically assume the “rational economic man” and the “inevitable optimal resource allocation by perfectly competitive markets,” thereby justifying the ownership of corporate entities by the holders of capital assets. Professional cooperatives, guided by this formalist logic, predominantly serve the interests of capitalized large-scale peasants. In contrast, the organizational practices from mutual aid to comprehensive cooperation during the Chinese revolutionary period reveal an alternative possibility diverging from formalist logic. This alternative centers on community-based rationality of small-scale peasant households, promoting agricultural development by enhancing resource use efficiency through community mutual aid among smallholders to meet their collective production and living needs. This substantivist logic, grounded in mutual aid practices, can also provide direction for integrating small-scale peasant households into large markets in the contemporary context.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"12 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140437428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341303
Xi Zhang
Abstract After the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, the rural economy of Hunan province was in decline. In southern provinces, where per capita arable land was minimal and the proportion of tenant farmers considerable, the tenancy system was notably harsh. In 1945, the Guomindang government implemented a one-year rent reduction policy in the recovered territories. However, due to real difficulties, Hunan province postponed its implementation until 1946 and again enacted a rent limit protection policy for tenants in 1947. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the Hunan Provincial Senate in 1946, provincial senators, representing local gentry interests, engaged in a conflict with the rent reduction ordinance put forth by the Hunan provincial government. The conflicting understandings between the two sides about the relationship between the existing system and rent reduction led to an impasse in the legislative process. Eventually, due to the provincial government’s compromises, the rent reduction ordinances were repeatedly revised and ultimately became hollow in substance. At the grassroots level, seeing this situation, implementation was delayed, turning the ordinances into mere paper decrees. Throughout this process, the tenant farmers, deceived by the landlords, resented the government, and the credibility of the Guomindang government was gradually depleted.
{"title":"Rent Reduction in Hunan and Government-Gentry Conflicts after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan","authors":"Xi Zhang","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341303","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, the rural economy of Hunan province was in decline. In southern provinces, where per capita arable land was minimal and the proportion of tenant farmers considerable, the tenancy system was notably harsh. In 1945, the Guomindang government implemented a one-year rent reduction policy in the recovered territories. However, due to real difficulties, Hunan province postponed its implementation until 1946 and again enacted a rent limit protection policy for tenants in 1947. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the Hunan Provincial Senate in 1946, provincial senators, representing local gentry interests, engaged in a conflict with the rent reduction ordinance put forth by the Hunan provincial government. The conflicting understandings between the two sides about the relationship between the existing system and rent reduction led to an impasse in the legislative process. Eventually, due to the provincial government’s compromises, the rent reduction ordinances were repeatedly revised and ultimately became hollow in substance. At the grassroots level, seeing this situation, implementation was delayed, turning the ordinances into mere paper decrees. Throughout this process, the tenant farmers, deceived by the landlords, resented the government, and the credibility of the Guomindang government was gradually depleted.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136379706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341301
Hongqin Deng, Weiqiang Ma
Abstract Contrary to the existing academic consensus that the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) shifted from strict purges to more lenient “education” in response to paralysis and other negative impacts on its cadre force during the land reform and party rectification, this paper posits that the process of addressing the pessimism, negativity, and work-shirking of cadres was not as simple as “education,” but rather a relatively difficult journey, with historical realities proving to be far richer and more complex. In face of the severe problem of cadre work-shirking during land reform and party rectification, the CCP gradually formed a clear understanding of the situation. While acknowledging mistakes, clarifying responsibilities, and striving to win back the cadres, the party also endeavored to eliminate ideological confusion, delineate right from wrong, and deal decisively with opportunists. For grassroots cadres, this also represented a transformative improvement adapted to revolution and societal development and changes. The resolution of the problem of cadre work-shirking highlights the wisdom and courage of the CCP as it confronted the negative impacts produced by miscalculations during land reform. It also illustrates the party’s internal aspirations and practical needs to vigorously develop production and achieve a smooth transition from “war” to “peace.”
{"title":"The Issue and Resolution of Grassroots Cadres’ Shirking of Work during the Land Reform and Party Rectification in Lucheng from 1948–1949","authors":"Hongqin Deng, Weiqiang Ma","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341301","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contrary to the existing academic consensus that the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) shifted from strict purges to more lenient “education” in response to paralysis and other negative impacts on its cadre force during the land reform and party rectification, this paper posits that the process of addressing the pessimism, negativity, and work-shirking of cadres was not as simple as “education,” but rather a relatively difficult journey, with historical realities proving to be far richer and more complex. In face of the severe problem of cadre work-shirking during land reform and party rectification, the CCP gradually formed a clear understanding of the situation. While acknowledging mistakes, clarifying responsibilities, and striving to win back the cadres, the party also endeavored to eliminate ideological confusion, delineate right from wrong, and deal decisively with opportunists. For grassroots cadres, this also represented a transformative improvement adapted to revolution and societal development and changes. The resolution of the problem of cadre work-shirking highlights the wisdom and courage of the CCP as it confronted the negative impacts produced by miscalculations during land reform. It also illustrates the party’s internal aspirations and practical needs to vigorously develop production and achieve a smooth transition from “war” to “peace.”","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136379548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341298
Genliang Jia
Abstract Although the current economics education system in universities in China differs from developed Western countries, China has been deliberately emulating the economics education system in the West over the past two decades, a system that has been repeatedly criticized by international movements such as the “Post-Autistic Economics Movement” and the “International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics.” This article argues that the dominant position of mainstream Western economics in Chinese higher education contradicts the scientific principles of pluralism and does not align with China’s national conditions and the necessity for the development of a philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics. Based on the proposals put forward by faculty and students involved in the international movement for the reform of economics education over the past 22 years, this article recommends reforms to address the major weaknesses of economics education in China. The reforms address ten areas for improvement, including the overall goals of pluralism in economics education, curriculum design, teaching methods, an independent academic evaluation system, faculty development, and the evaluation of academic disciplines. The purpose of these reforms is to destabilize the dominant position of mainstream Western economics in higher education in China and gradually establish a new economics education system with a curriculum based on a plurality of approaches, a variety of critical pedagogies, and a methodology of problem-based learning.
{"title":"Reflections on Economics Education in China and Suggestions for Its Reform","authors":"Genliang Jia","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341298","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although the current economics education system in universities in China differs from developed Western countries, China has been deliberately emulating the economics education system in the West over the past two decades, a system that has been repeatedly criticized by international movements such as the “Post-Autistic Economics Movement” and the “International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics.” This article argues that the dominant position of mainstream Western economics in Chinese higher education contradicts the scientific principles of pluralism and does not align with China’s national conditions and the necessity for the development of a philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics. Based on the proposals put forward by faculty and students involved in the international movement for the reform of economics education over the past 22 years, this article recommends reforms to address the major weaknesses of economics education in China. The reforms address ten areas for improvement, including the overall goals of pluralism in economics education, curriculum design, teaching methods, an independent academic evaluation system, faculty development, and the evaluation of academic disciplines. The purpose of these reforms is to destabilize the dominant position of mainstream Western economics in higher education in China and gradually establish a new economics education system with a curriculum based on a plurality of approaches, a variety of critical pedagogies, and a methodology of problem-based learning.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136379703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1163/22136746-12341302
Gui Zeng, Qianhou Yue
Abstract Water disputes between Hunan and Hubei provinces persisted from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, and the Tianhu Embankment case stands as a representative conflict between the two provinces concerning lake and river management. The dispute originated from the construction of embankments by people from Hunan in the Datong Lake, a sub-lake of Dongting Lake. People from Hubei argued that the embankments significantly reduced the flood storage capacity of Dongting Lake and that river floods would directly inundate the riverside counties. On the contrary, people from Hunan argued that the construction of the Tianhu Embankment did not hinder water management and that the key to solving the problem of water disasters lay in dredging rivers and not in destroying the fertile farmland that tens of thousands of people relied on for survival. From 1936 until the collapse of the Guomindang government’s rule on mainland China, a dispute lasting over a decade unfolded over the issue of dismantling the Tianhu Embankment. Both provinces used various tactics, such as leveraging local interpersonal networks, creating public opinion through news media, and using “people-oriented” rhetoric. This issue was frequently mentioned in official correspondences between the Executive Yuan of the Guomindang government and the two provinces. Numerous high-ranking officials from both provinces were involved in the dispute, and it even escalated to the point where Chiang Kai-shek had to intervene. Though the case remained unresolved for a long time, it was temporarily concluded at the end of 1947 with the symbolic dismantling of nine outlets in the major dikes of the Dongheng East Islet and the Orphan Embankment. However, these outlets were soon refilled by people from Hunan, making the case an unresolved legacy of the Guomindang Government on the mainland. Reviewing the development and outcome of this case, the Guomindang Government always appeared as a conciliator in the dispute, but ended up yielding ground and making a muted exit. The helplessness and impotence that the Nationalist Government displayed in resolving this problem vividly illustrate its weak governance capability.
{"title":"A Political Historical Examination of the Tianhu Embankment Case at Dongting Lake (1937–1949)","authors":"Gui Zeng, Qianhou Yue","doi":"10.1163/22136746-12341302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22136746-12341302","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Water disputes between Hunan and Hubei provinces persisted from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, and the Tianhu Embankment case stands as a representative conflict between the two provinces concerning lake and river management. The dispute originated from the construction of embankments by people from Hunan in the Datong Lake, a sub-lake of Dongting Lake. People from Hubei argued that the embankments significantly reduced the flood storage capacity of Dongting Lake and that river floods would directly inundate the riverside counties. On the contrary, people from Hunan argued that the construction of the Tianhu Embankment did not hinder water management and that the key to solving the problem of water disasters lay in dredging rivers and not in destroying the fertile farmland that tens of thousands of people relied on for survival. From 1936 until the collapse of the Guomindang government’s rule on mainland China, a dispute lasting over a decade unfolded over the issue of dismantling the Tianhu Embankment. Both provinces used various tactics, such as leveraging local interpersonal networks, creating public opinion through news media, and using “people-oriented” rhetoric. This issue was frequently mentioned in official correspondences between the Executive Yuan of the Guomindang government and the two provinces. Numerous high-ranking officials from both provinces were involved in the dispute, and it even escalated to the point where Chiang Kai-shek had to intervene. Though the case remained unresolved for a long time, it was temporarily concluded at the end of 1947 with the symbolic dismantling of nine outlets in the major dikes of the Dongheng East Islet and the Orphan Embankment. However, these outlets were soon refilled by people from Hunan, making the case an unresolved legacy of the Guomindang Government on the mainland. Reviewing the development and outcome of this case, the Guomindang Government always appeared as a conciliator in the dispute, but ended up yielding ground and making a muted exit. The helplessness and impotence that the Nationalist Government displayed in resolving this problem vividly illustrate its weak governance capability.","PeriodicalId":37171,"journal":{"name":"Rural China","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136379701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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