Explaining state participation in ten universal WMD treaties: A survival analysis of ratification decisions

Abstract

ABSTRACT Much of what we know about state participation in universal weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties is based on research about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This article instead analyzes the ratification of all ten current WMD treaties. Using a survival analysis of ratification events (1960–2022), it challenges conventional wisdom. It shows that security threats—a factor stressed by neorealists and research on the NPT—provide only a weak and incomplete explanation. Instead, three types of costs and benefits influence ratification decisions: policy change costs, benefits from the secondary functions of treaties, and benefits from the conformity with the ratification behavior of regional peers. More specifically, the article finds that the possession and pursuit of WMD delays ratification. The country’s support for the liberal hegemonic order, the level of its economic development, and a high regional ratification rate of the respective treaty increase the probability of ratification.