Values define agency: Ecological and enactive perspectives reconsidered

Abstract

This article offers an exploration of agency and its place in the natural order, one marked by meaning and value. Three examples of agency at different scales—human, bacterial, and thermodynamic—are presented, which reveal insights into the nature of agency itself, while also illustrating the range of phenomena that theoretical accounts need to address. Three approaches to agency are then explored, an enactive approach and two ecological accounts, Reed’s “effort after meaning and value” and ecological values-realizing theory. These approaches are compared from the perspective of ecological values-realizing theory, noting differences and similarities between them. The article is intended to be exploratory, so that the contributions of each of the three accounts can be appreciated, while posing sharp questions and challenges from an ecological values-realizing perspective. Claims considered include: Agency is characteristic of the ecosystem in its entirety, not only in its organismic components. A defining aspect of agency is the possibility of acting in ways that increase freedom and other values. Values function as ecosystem defining constraints. Agency requires hope and responsibility, going beyond goal-achievement toward increasing the integrity of the ecosystem. Agency is marked by interdependence and self-criticism more than autonomy. Living systems create and increase instability.