Pub Date : 2024-08-29DOI: 10.1177/10597123241278799
Özlem Yilmaz
Facing stress and producing stress responses are crucial aspects of an organism’s life and the evolution of both its species and of the other species in its environment, which are co-evolving with it. Philosophers and biologists emphasize the importance of environmental complexity and how organisms deal with it in evolution of cognitive processes. This article adds to these discussions by highlighting the importance of stress physiology in processes connected to plant cognition. While this article supports the thesis that life means cognizing (i.e., sensing the environment, arranging internal processes according to that perception, and affecting the environment with its actions), it also emphasizes that there are various kinds of organisms. In this regard, plant cognition is not animal cognition. However, given both the variety and continuity in evolutionary processes and the similarities even between the distantly related organisms in the tree of life, I argue that it is usually useful to consider and compare physiological and molecular mechanisms in plants and animals as well as the concepts and research processes in animal and plant science. Although the “pathological complexity” thesis that Veit (2023) presents is fruitful in considering the evolution of consciousness and cognition, I argue that, when thinking of biological processes in relation to cognition, stress can be a helpful concept (maybe even as suitable as pathological complexity) in thinking of organisms’ responses to environmental complexity and their adaptation and acclimation processes.
{"title":"Environmental complexity, cognition, and plant stress physiology","authors":"Özlem Yilmaz","doi":"10.1177/10597123241278799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241278799","url":null,"abstract":"Facing stress and producing stress responses are crucial aspects of an organism’s life and the evolution of both its species and of the other species in its environment, which are co-evolving with it. Philosophers and biologists emphasize the importance of environmental complexity and how organisms deal with it in evolution of cognitive processes. This article adds to these discussions by highlighting the importance of stress physiology in processes connected to plant cognition. While this article supports the thesis that life means cognizing (i.e., sensing the environment, arranging internal processes according to that perception, and affecting the environment with its actions), it also emphasizes that there are various kinds of organisms. In this regard, plant cognition is not animal cognition. However, given both the variety and continuity in evolutionary processes and the similarities even between the distantly related organisms in the tree of life, I argue that it is usually useful to consider and compare physiological and molecular mechanisms in plants and animals as well as the concepts and research processes in animal and plant science. Although the “pathological complexity” thesis that Veit (2023) presents is fruitful in considering the evolution of consciousness and cognition, I argue that, when thinking of biological processes in relation to cognition, stress can be a helpful concept (maybe even as suitable as pathological complexity) in thinking of organisms’ responses to environmental complexity and their adaptation and acclimation processes.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"184 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142196154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-29DOI: 10.1177/10597123241268216
Eric Chalmers, Matthieu Bardal, Robert McDonald, Edgar Bermudez-Contreras
Animals can navigate through complex environments with amazing flexibility and efficiency: they forage over large areas, quickly learning rewarding behavior and changing their plans when necessary. Some insights into the neural mechanisms supporting this ability can be found in the hippocampus (HPC)—a brain structure involved in navigation, learning, and memory. Neuronal activity in the HPC provides a hierarchical representation of space, representing an environment at multiple scales. In addition, it has been observed that when memory-consolidation processes in the HPC are inactivated, animals can still plan and navigate in a familiar environment but not in new environments. Findings like these suggest three useful principles: spatial learning is hierarchical, learning a hierarchical world-model is intrinsically valuable, and action planning occurs as a downstream process separate from learning. Here, we demonstrate computationally how an agent could learn hierarchical models of an environment using off-line replay of trajectories through that environment and show empirically that this allows computationally efficient planning to reach arbitrary goals within a reinforcement learning setting. Using the computational model to simulate hippocampal damage reproduces navigation behaviors observed in rodents with hippocampal inactivation. The approach presented here might help to clarify different interpretations of some spatial navigation studies in rodents and present some implications for future studies of both machine and biological intelligence.
{"title":"A model of how hierarchical representations constructed in the hippocampus are used to navigate through space","authors":"Eric Chalmers, Matthieu Bardal, Robert McDonald, Edgar Bermudez-Contreras","doi":"10.1177/10597123241268216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241268216","url":null,"abstract":"Animals can navigate through complex environments with amazing flexibility and efficiency: they forage over large areas, quickly learning rewarding behavior and changing their plans when necessary. Some insights into the neural mechanisms supporting this ability can be found in the hippocampus (HPC)—a brain structure involved in navigation, learning, and memory. Neuronal activity in the HPC provides a hierarchical representation of space, representing an environment at multiple scales. In addition, it has been observed that when memory-consolidation processes in the HPC are inactivated, animals can still plan and navigate in a familiar environment but not in new environments. Findings like these suggest three useful principles: spatial learning is hierarchical, learning a hierarchical world-model is intrinsically valuable, and action planning occurs as a downstream process separate from learning. Here, we demonstrate computationally how an agent could learn hierarchical models of an environment using off-line replay of trajectories through that environment and show empirically that this allows computationally efficient planning to reach arbitrary goals within a reinforcement learning setting. Using the computational model to simulate hippocampal damage reproduces navigation behaviors observed in rodents with hippocampal inactivation. The approach presented here might help to clarify different interpretations of some spatial navigation studies in rodents and present some implications for future studies of both machine and biological intelligence.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142196155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-16DOI: 10.1177/10597123241270764
Manuel Baum, Theresa Rössler, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró, Alice Auersperg, Oliver Brock
Goffin’s cockatoos ( Cacatua goffiniana) can solve a diverse set of mechanical problems, such as tool use, tool manufacture, and mechanical puzzles. However, the proximate mechanisms underlying this adaptive behavior are largely unknown. Similarly, engineering artificial agents that can as flexibly solve such mechanical puzzles is still a substantial challenge in areas such as robotics. This article is an interdisciplinary approach to study mechanical problem solving which we hope is relevant to both fields. The behavior we are studying results from the interaction between a complex environment (the lockbox) and different processes that govern the animals’ behavior. We therefore jointly analyze the parrots’ (1) engagement, (2) sensorimotor skill learning, and (3) action selection. We find that none of these aspects could solely explain the animals’ behavioral adaptation and that a plausible model of proximate mechanisms must jointly address these aspects. We accompany this analysis with a discussion of methods to identify such mechanisms. At the same time, we argue, it is implausible to identify a detailed model from the limited behavioral data of just a few studies. Instead, we advocate for an incremental approach to model building in which one first establishes constraints on proximate mechanisms before specific, detailed models are formulated. To illustrate this idea, we apply it to the data presented here. We argue that as the field attempts to find mechanistic explanations for increasingly complex behaviors, such alternative modeling approaches will be necessary.
{"title":"Mechanical Problem Solving in Goffin’s Cockatoos—Towards Modeling Complex Behavior","authors":"Manuel Baum, Theresa Rössler, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró, Alice Auersperg, Oliver Brock","doi":"10.1177/10597123241270764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241270764","url":null,"abstract":"Goffin’s cockatoos ( Cacatua goffiniana) can solve a diverse set of mechanical problems, such as tool use, tool manufacture, and mechanical puzzles. However, the proximate mechanisms underlying this adaptive behavior are largely unknown. Similarly, engineering artificial agents that can as flexibly solve such mechanical puzzles is still a substantial challenge in areas such as robotics. This article is an interdisciplinary approach to study mechanical problem solving which we hope is relevant to both fields. The behavior we are studying results from the interaction between a complex environment (the lockbox) and different processes that govern the animals’ behavior. We therefore jointly analyze the parrots’ (1) engagement, (2) sensorimotor skill learning, and (3) action selection. We find that none of these aspects could solely explain the animals’ behavioral adaptation and that a plausible model of proximate mechanisms must jointly address these aspects. We accompany this analysis with a discussion of methods to identify such mechanisms. At the same time, we argue, it is implausible to identify a detailed model from the limited behavioral data of just a few studies. Instead, we advocate for an incremental approach to model building in which one first establishes constraints on proximate mechanisms before specific, detailed models are formulated. To illustrate this idea, we apply it to the data presented here. We argue that as the field attempts to find mechanistic explanations for increasingly complex behaviors, such alternative modeling approaches will be necessary.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142196157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-19DOI: 10.1177/10597123241263607
Johannes Wagemann
A core issue of embodiment is the question of how phenomenal and agentive consciousness relates to external forms of behavior. Instead of biasing the question in terms of the “hard problem” as to why and how consciousness arises from brain processes (D. Chalmers), it is suggested to ask for psychophysical correlations in a metaphysically neutral way. This, however, demands (1) to explore both sides of the problem with equivalent precision and depth—not only the physical—and (2) to develop a metaphysically neutral tool to formalize them in a consistent way. Concerning (1), the basic structure of mental micro-activities found in first-person studies on cognitive processes suggests extending the scope of qualia as a mark of consciousness. In the context of Structure Phenomenology (H. Witzenmann), functionally negative phenomenality experienced in ambiguous or meaning-deprived situations and inner agentive qualia of mental activities are correlated with the decompositional signature of sensory-neural processing and synchronized neural oscillations. Concerning (2), G. Günther’s Transclassical Logic is briefly introduced and deployed to integrate the mental, psychophysical, and physical contextures in a three-valued formal framework which also includes enacted and embodied aspects. The emerging picture rebalances first-person and third-person aspects of cognition by functionally separating and dynamically integrating them, thus revitalizing the neurophenomenological research agenda with new experimental proposals and concrete hypotheses.
{"title":"Coupling First-Person Cognitive Research With Neurophilosophy and Enactivism: An Outline of Arguments","authors":"Johannes Wagemann","doi":"10.1177/10597123241263607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241263607","url":null,"abstract":"A core issue of embodiment is the question of how phenomenal and agentive consciousness relates to external forms of behavior. Instead of biasing the question in terms of the “hard problem” as to why and how consciousness arises from brain processes (D. Chalmers), it is suggested to ask for psychophysical correlations in a metaphysically neutral way. This, however, demands (1) to explore both sides of the problem with equivalent precision and depth—not only the physical—and (2) to develop a metaphysically neutral tool to formalize them in a consistent way. Concerning (1), the basic structure of mental micro-activities found in first-person studies on cognitive processes suggests extending the scope of qualia as a mark of consciousness. In the context of Structure Phenomenology (H. Witzenmann), functionally negative phenomenality experienced in ambiguous or meaning-deprived situations and inner agentive qualia of mental activities are correlated with the decompositional signature of sensory-neural processing and synchronized neural oscillations. Concerning (2), G. Günther’s Transclassical Logic is briefly introduced and deployed to integrate the mental, psychophysical, and physical contextures in a three-valued formal framework which also includes enacted and embodied aspects. The emerging picture rebalances first-person and third-person aspects of cognition by functionally separating and dynamically integrating them, thus revitalizing the neurophenomenological research agenda with new experimental proposals and concrete hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141741998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-21DOI: 10.1177/10597123241262534
Chrisantha Fernando, Simon Osindero, Dylan Banarse
External representations ( ERs) are objects or performances in the world whose proper function is to communicate about other things in the world. Why and how did we make them, and what do they give us? We outline a simple framework for thinking about ERs grounded in modern machine learning. We propose a minimal set of neural mechanisms needed for open-ended ER production. Our constructivist enactive view contrasts with nativist views which propose specialist neural modules requiring symbolic internal representations. We propose a plausible set of (biological and cultural) evolutionary steps to full Gricean symbolic communication via a set of increasingly complex enactive algorithms for ER production. A pragmatic space of games is defined, which includes not only fully cooperative language games but also science, art, and evolved signal manipulation games. This space is defined by the complexity of learning needed by sender and receiver. We propose that one important step towards open-ended ER use was selection for bush reading, which like mind-reading is an inferential process requiring complex contextual and syntactic understanding of cues about events displaced in space and time. Bush reading pre-adapted receivers to be receptive, competent, and perspicacious interpreters of later intentionally produced signals about hidden topics such as felt mental states. This paved the way for minimally Gricean communication, which subsequently could be bootstrapped into explicit theories of mind, folk psychology narratives, and symbolic language in general. Recent findings in cognitive archaeology are integrated within the framework, and new experiments in machine learning suggested.
外部表征（ER）是世界上的物体或表演，其应有的功能是传达世界上其他事物的信息。我们为什么和如何制造它们，它们又能给我们带来什么？我们以现代机器学习为基础，概述了一个思考外部表征的简单框架。我们提出了一套开放式ER生成所需的最基本神经机制。我们的建构主义能动观点与本位主义观点形成了鲜明对比，后者提出了需要符号化内部表征的专业神经模块。我们提出了一套合理的（生物和文化）进化步骤，通过一套日益复杂的ER生成主动算法，实现完全的格莱斯式符号交流。我们定义了一个实用的游戏空间，其中不仅包括完全合作的语言游戏，还包括科学、艺术和进化的信号操作游戏。这个空间是根据发送方和接收方所需学习的复杂程度来定义的。我们认为，选择灌木丛阅读是实现开放式 ER 使用的重要一步，灌木丛阅读与读心术一样，是一种推理过程，需要对时空错位事件的线索进行复杂的上下文和句法理解。灌木丛阅读使接收者预先适应，能够接受、胜任和敏锐地解释后来有意产生的关于隐蔽主题（如感觉到的心理状态）的信号。这为格莱斯最小化交流铺平了道路，而格莱斯最小化交流随后可引导为明确的心智理论、民间心理学叙事和一般符号语言。该框架整合了认知考古学的最新发现，并提出了机器学习的新实验。
{"title":"The origin and function of external representations","authors":"Chrisantha Fernando, Simon Osindero, Dylan Banarse","doi":"10.1177/10597123241262534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241262534","url":null,"abstract":"External representations ( ERs) are objects or performances in the world whose proper function is to communicate about other things in the world. Why and how did we make them, and what do they give us? We outline a simple framework for thinking about ERs grounded in modern machine learning. We propose a minimal set of neural mechanisms needed for open-ended ER production. Our constructivist enactive view contrasts with nativist views which propose specialist neural modules requiring symbolic internal representations. We propose a plausible set of (biological and cultural) evolutionary steps to full Gricean symbolic communication via a set of increasingly complex enactive algorithms for ER production. A pragmatic space of games is defined, which includes not only fully cooperative language games but also science, art, and evolved signal manipulation games. This space is defined by the complexity of learning needed by sender and receiver. We propose that one important step towards open-ended ER use was selection for bush reading, which like mind-reading is an inferential process requiring complex contextual and syntactic understanding of cues about events displaced in space and time. Bush reading pre-adapted receivers to be receptive, competent, and perspicacious interpreters of later intentionally produced signals about hidden topics such as felt mental states. This paved the way for minimally Gricean communication, which subsequently could be bootstrapped into explicit theories of mind, folk psychology narratives, and symbolic language in general. Recent findings in cognitive archaeology are integrated within the framework, and new experiments in machine learning suggested.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-24DOI: 10.1177/10597123241256754
Stefano Nolfi
Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of displaying a wide range of abilities that are not directly connected with the task for which they are trained: predicting the next words of human-written texts. In this article, I review recent research investigating the cognitive abilities developed by LLMs and their relation to human cognition. I discuss the nature of the indirect process that leads to the acquisition of these cognitive abilities, their relation to other indirect processes, and the implications for the acquisition of integrated abilities. Moreover, I propose the factors that enable the development of abilities that are related only very indirectly to the proximal objective of the training task. Finally, I discuss whether the full set of capabilities that LLMs could possibly develop is predictable.
{"title":"On the Unexpected Abilities of Large Language Models","authors":"Stefano Nolfi","doi":"10.1177/10597123241256754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241256754","url":null,"abstract":"Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of displaying a wide range of abilities that are not directly connected with the task for which they are trained: predicting the next words of human-written texts. In this article, I review recent research investigating the cognitive abilities developed by LLMs and their relation to human cognition. I discuss the nature of the indirect process that leads to the acquisition of these cognitive abilities, their relation to other indirect processes, and the implications for the acquisition of integrated abilities. Moreover, I propose the factors that enable the development of abilities that are related only very indirectly to the proximal objective of the training task. Finally, I discuss whether the full set of capabilities that LLMs could possibly develop is predictable.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141146613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The COVID-19 pandemic (hereinafter “the pandemic”) necessitated social distancing measures and limited physical contact, prompting the exploration of alternative methods for tasks like object delivery. Mobile service robots emerged as a potential solution, offering a bridge between humans and various tasks. While existing techniques have been introduced to enable robots to deliver objects in an end-to-end manner, they come with limitations. Grippers, for instance, can deliver only one object per round, cabinet robots require manual speed tuning to keep the object in place, and object holders lack generalizability. Inspired by the idea of human nature to use a tray to deliver the object, we developed the Visual-Based Adaptive Interaction System (hereinafter “VAIS”), a novel learning system, to improve service delivery using visual information and a fast neural learning mechanism. Within this system, the robot learns the optimal angular rotational and linear translational moving speeds to effectively transport objects placed on a tray without an extra holder. The robot validates these learnt movements by successfully completing multiple-object delivery tasks along designated routes. The results exhibit that the robot can utilize online learning after a few attempts to determine its proper moving speed and deliver different objects to a given location.
{"title":"A framework for visual-based adaptive object-robot interaction of a mobile service robot","authors":"Puchong Soisudarat, Tanyatep Tothong, Kawee Tiraborisute, Nat Dilokthanakul, Poramate Manoonpong","doi":"10.1177/10597123241242491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241242491","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic (hereinafter “the pandemic”) necessitated social distancing measures and limited physical contact, prompting the exploration of alternative methods for tasks like object delivery. Mobile service robots emerged as a potential solution, offering a bridge between humans and various tasks. While existing techniques have been introduced to enable robots to deliver objects in an end-to-end manner, they come with limitations. Grippers, for instance, can deliver only one object per round, cabinet robots require manual speed tuning to keep the object in place, and object holders lack generalizability. Inspired by the idea of human nature to use a tray to deliver the object, we developed the Visual-Based Adaptive Interaction System (hereinafter “VAIS”), a novel learning system, to improve service delivery using visual information and a fast neural learning mechanism. Within this system, the robot learns the optimal angular rotational and linear translational moving speeds to effectively transport objects placed on a tray without an extra holder. The robot validates these learnt movements by successfully completing multiple-object delivery tasks along designated routes. The results exhibit that the robot can utilize online learning after a few attempts to determine its proper moving speed and deliver different objects to a given location.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140811712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-22DOI: 10.1177/10597123241229735
David Habets, Erik Rietveld, Julian Kiverstein, Damiaan Denys
We draw on insights from ecological psychology, explorative architecture, and psychiatry to provide an analysis of basic trust in relation to urban places. We use the term basic trust to refer to the attitude of certainty we express when we act in skilled, often unreflective, habitual ways in the living environment. We will argue that the basic trust of people living in cities should be understood in relation to what we will call trusted urban places. Trusted urban places can be understood similarly as what Giovanna Colombetti and Joel Krueger have called “affective niches” that provide affordances for amplifying, dampening, and sustaining affective states. The basic trust of people living in cities, we will argue, depends upon people moving through and engaging with trusted urban places. In urbanism and architecture, it is barely recognized how the city affords places of affective significance that the person incorporates into their bodily way of existing. Persistent exposure to urban stressors can disturb basic trust in one’s living environment, resulting in a person no longer being at home in the world. We provide examples in which people, as a consequence of the repeated exposure to stressors, no longer move through and engage with trusted urban places, and the impact this has on their basic trust. Our aim is to understand how the urban environment can contribute to the path from stress to anxiety and mood disorders, and how a person can regain their openness to possibilities for regulating their emotions skilfully.
{"title":"Trusted Urban Places","authors":"David Habets, Erik Rietveld, Julian Kiverstein, Damiaan Denys","doi":"10.1177/10597123241229735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241229735","url":null,"abstract":"We draw on insights from ecological psychology, explorative architecture, and psychiatry to provide an analysis of basic trust in relation to urban places. We use the term basic trust to refer to the attitude of certainty we express when we act in skilled, often unreflective, habitual ways in the living environment. We will argue that the basic trust of people living in cities should be understood in relation to what we will call trusted urban places. Trusted urban places can be understood similarly as what Giovanna Colombetti and Joel Krueger have called “affective niches” that provide affordances for amplifying, dampening, and sustaining affective states. The basic trust of people living in cities, we will argue, depends upon people moving through and engaging with trusted urban places. In urbanism and architecture, it is barely recognized how the city affords places of affective significance that the person incorporates into their bodily way of existing. Persistent exposure to urban stressors can disturb basic trust in one’s living environment, resulting in a person no longer being at home in the world. We provide examples in which people, as a consequence of the repeated exposure to stressors, no longer move through and engage with trusted urban places, and the impact this has on their basic trust. Our aim is to understand how the urban environment can contribute to the path from stress to anxiety and mood disorders, and how a person can regain their openness to possibilities for regulating their emotions skilfully.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"109 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140636776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-19DOI: 10.1177/10597123241232170
Gregory M Kohn, Mateusz Kostecki
While organisms are continually experiencing and interacting with their environments, the role and extent of experiences in behavioral development has been controversial. Some argue that adaptive behaviors are acquired through experiences, while others claim they are the result of innate programs that don’t require environmental input. Such controversies have historically occurred within animal behavior and psychology, but similar debates are emerging in the field of artificial intelligence. Here, the debate is centered on those who design experience-dependent systems that are trained to learn the statistical properties of “environmental” inputs, and those advocating the use of pre-packaged artificially “innate” responses tailored to prespecified inputs. Those favoring artificial innateness draw analogies with animal behavior to argue that innateness is necessary for the emergence of complex adaptive behavior. But does behavioral development in animals reflect the unfolding of innate programs? Here we highlight the widespread role of specifically causal experiences in the ontogeny of species-typical behaviors. All behaviors are an outcome of a chain of organism-environment transactions—called ontogenetic niches—that begin in the earliest periods of life. This challenges the notion that organisms come prepared with innate programs for behavior. We suggest that an artificial intelligence that matches the complexity of animal behavior should be based on principles of behavioral development, where experiences are necessary and specifically causal factors in the emergence of behavioral abilities.
{"title":"The contingent animal: does artificial innateness misrepresent behavioral development?","authors":"Gregory M Kohn, Mateusz Kostecki","doi":"10.1177/10597123241232170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123241232170","url":null,"abstract":"While organisms are continually experiencing and interacting with their environments, the role and extent of experiences in behavioral development has been controversial. Some argue that adaptive behaviors are acquired through experiences, while others claim they are the result of innate programs that don’t require environmental input. Such controversies have historically occurred within animal behavior and psychology, but similar debates are emerging in the field of artificial intelligence. Here, the debate is centered on those who design experience-dependent systems that are trained to learn the statistical properties of “environmental” inputs, and those advocating the use of pre-packaged artificially “innate” responses tailored to prespecified inputs. Those favoring artificial innateness draw analogies with animal behavior to argue that innateness is necessary for the emergence of complex adaptive behavior. But does behavioral development in animals reflect the unfolding of innate programs? Here we highlight the widespread role of specifically causal experiences in the ontogeny of species-typical behaviors. All behaviors are an outcome of a chain of organism-environment transactions—called ontogenetic niches—that begin in the earliest periods of life. This challenges the notion that organisms come prepared with innate programs for behavior. We suggest that an artificial intelligence that matches the complexity of animal behavior should be based on principles of behavioral development, where experiences are necessary and specifically causal factors in the emergence of behavioral abilities.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139954693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-10DOI: 10.1177/10597123231221312
Fabian Steinbeck, Efstathios Kagioulis, Alex D. M. Dewar, A. Philippides, Thomas Nowotny, Paul Graham
Many insects use view-based navigation, or snapshot matching, to return to familiar locations, or navigate routes. This relies on egocentric memories being matched to current views of the world. Previous Snapshot navigation algorithms have used full panoramic vision for the comparison of memorised images with query images to establish a measure of familiarity, which leads to a recovery of the original heading direction from when the snapshot was taken. Many aspects of insect sensory systems are lateralised with steering being derived from the comparison of left and right signals like a classic Braitenberg vehicle. Here, we investigate whether view-based route navigation can be implemented using bilateral visual familiarity comparisons. We found that the difference in familiarity between estimates from left and right fields of view can be used as a steering signal to recover the original heading direction. This finding extends across many different sizes of field of view and visual resolutions. In insects, steering computations are implemented in a brain region called the Lateral Accessory Lobe, within the Central Complex. In a simple simulation, we show with an SNN model of the LAL an existence proof of how bilateral visual familiarity could drive a search for a visually defined goal.
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