Do Governments Hide Resources from Unions? The Influence of Public Sector Unions on Reported Discretionary Fund Balance Ratios

IF 4.9 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-06-21 DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12497
ANGELA K. GORE, YUAN JI, SUSAN L. KULP
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources outside of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether governments with unions report lower ratios within accessible general fund balance account categories – that is, report lower proportions of unreserved fund balance. Primary findings are consistent with both hypotheses. Although somewhat mixed, cross-sectional analyses reveal that effects are magnified when unions have more bargaining power, as proxied by the ability to strike or the absence of state right-to-work laws. Further analysis corroborates cross-sectional findings by examining difference-in-differences specifications surrounding the quasi-exogenous shock of Wisconsin's 2011 weakening of state public sector union laws and Ohio's time-varying union contract negotiations. Overall, the evidence suggests that governments with unions shelter resources to avoid the appearance of large discretionary amounts available.

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政府是否向工会隐瞒资源?公共部门工会对报告的可自由支配基金余额比率的影响
我们探讨了与没有公共部门工会的城市相比,有公共部门工会的城市是否利用政府(或“基金”)会计方面来模糊基金余额账户中可自由支配资源的可用性。我们首先调查了拥有工会的政府是否报告了普通基金(财务健康的主要衡量标准)之外的较高比例的可自由支配资源,而不是在不太突出的基金类型中。其次,我们探讨了有工会的政府是否报告了较低的可获取普通基金余额账户类别的比率,即报告了较低的非预留基金余额比例。初步发现与两种假设一致。虽然有些混合,但横断面分析表明,当工会拥有更多的议价能力时,影响会被放大,就像罢工的能力或缺乏州工作权法一样。进一步的分析证实了横断面研究结果,通过检查围绕威斯康星州2011年削弱州公共部门工会法律和俄亥俄州随时间变化的工会合同谈判的准外生冲击的差异规范。总的来说,有证据表明,拥有工会的政府庇护资源,以避免出现大量可自由支配的资金。
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来源期刊
Journal of Accounting Research
Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.80%
发文量
53
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting and related fields that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. This research typically uses analytical, empirical archival, experimental, and field study methods and addresses economic questions, external and internal, in accounting, auditing, disclosure, financial reporting, taxation, and information as well as related fields such as corporate finance, investments, capital markets, law, contracting, and information economics.
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