Spencer B. Anderson, Kim I. Mendoza, Cassie Mongold
Classification of financial statement elements into categories is an inherent, integral part of the financial reporting system. Although prior research documents that categories influence users’ perceptions of included items, we explore the reverse effect—how classifying items in a category can impact perceptions of the category itself and its other members. Using categorization theory from psychology and accounting literature and exploiting the classification challenges inherent to the crypto asset setting, we predict and find that classifying individual items into a category can impact equity analysts’ perceptions of the category itself and perceptions of the category's other members. We also explore the boundaries of this effect and find that categories like intangibles, with fewer common prototypical features, are more susceptible to these classification effects. Our results show several ways in which balance sheet classification could lead to unintended consequences for users.
{"title":"The Effect of Intangible Asset Classification on Professional Financial Statement Users’ Assessments","authors":"Spencer B. Anderson, Kim I. Mendoza, Cassie Mongold","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12604","url":null,"abstract":"Classification of financial statement elements into categories is an inherent, integral part of the financial reporting system. Although prior research documents that categories influence users’ perceptions of included items, we explore the reverse effect—how classifying items in a category can impact perceptions of the category itself and its other members. Using categorization theory from psychology and accounting literature and exploiting the classification challenges inherent to the crypto asset setting, we predict and find that classifying individual items into a category can impact equity analysts’ perceptions of the category itself and perceptions of the category's other members. We also explore the boundaries of this effect and find that categories like intangibles, with fewer common prototypical features, are more susceptible to these classification effects. Our results show several ways in which balance sheet classification could lead to unintended consequences for users.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143545852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short-term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow-up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow-up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first-mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre-mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short-term information environments of unvisited peer firms.
{"title":"Public Disclosure of Private Meetings: Does Observing Peers’ Information Acquisition Affect Analysts’ Attention Allocation?","authors":"Yi Ru, Ronghuo Zheng, Yuan Zou","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12603","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short-term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow-up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow-up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first-mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre-mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short-term information environments of unvisited peer firms.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143532761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study how the disclosure of the liquidity coverage ratio mandated for a group of systemically important U.S. banks affects peer banks' liquidity holdings. I predict that the disclosure mitigates uncertainty about aggregate liquidity risk by providing insight into the likelihood of market-wide liquidity shocks and specific sources of liquidity stress. This uncertainty resolution, in turn, reduces nondisclosing banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Using bank business interactions to measure the treatment intensity of the disclosure, I find that more treated nondisclosing banks cut their liquidity significantly more in response to the disclosure. In addition, the disclosure rule was followed by lower overall liquidity and a build-up of systemic risk, indicating an economically considerable disclosure spillover effect in the aggregate. My paper reveals a new economic force, the spillover effect of mandated liquidity disclosure, that shapes banks' liquidity holdings.
{"title":"The Spillover Effect of Liquidity Transparency on Liquidity Holdings","authors":"YAO LU","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12602","url":null,"abstract":"I study how the disclosure of the liquidity coverage ratio mandated for a group of systemically important U.S. banks affects peer banks' liquidity holdings. I predict that the disclosure mitigates uncertainty about aggregate liquidity risk by providing insight into the likelihood of market-wide liquidity shocks and specific sources of liquidity stress. This uncertainty resolution, in turn, reduces nondisclosing banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Using bank business interactions to measure the treatment intensity of the disclosure, I find that more treated nondisclosing banks cut their liquidity significantly more in response to the disclosure. In addition, the disclosure rule was followed by lower overall liquidity and a build-up of systemic risk, indicating an economically considerable disclosure spillover effect in the aggregate. My paper reveals a new economic force, the spillover effect of mandated liquidity disclosure, that shapes banks' liquidity holdings.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Upward influencers, employees who are more favorably perceived by their supervisors than their peers and subordinates, are predicted by economic and accounting theories and are found to be ubiquitous in many organizations. Despite their prevalence, the role of upward influencers in teams remains underexplored. This paper fills this void by using proprietary data from a service-providing organization that allows for the identification of upward influencers based on its 360-degree person evaluation. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the fraction of upward influencers in a team and team performance. In cross-sectional analyses, we show that this relationship is driven by conditions when the need for collaboration and information sharing is high and when managers are less experienced. Additional tests exploring the mechanisms for the role of upward influencers in teams suggest that they impair team horizontal relationships through lowering the willingness to communicate, share knowledge, and offer mutual assistance among team members. Yet, teams with upward influencers build better vertical relationships with supervisors, which, in return, is associated with supervisors allocating more of their time to provide team members with feedback and guidance. Taken together, this study contributes to the understanding of upward influencers in teams.
{"title":"Upward Influencers in Teams","authors":"Wei Cai, Yaxuan Chen, Jee-Eun Shin","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12601","url":null,"abstract":"Upward influencers, employees who are more favorably perceived by their supervisors than their peers and subordinates, are predicted by economic and accounting theories and are found to be ubiquitous in many organizations. Despite their prevalence, the role of upward influencers in teams remains underexplored. This paper fills this void by using proprietary data from a service-providing organization that allows for the identification of upward influencers based on its 360-degree person evaluation. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the fraction of upward influencers in a team and team performance. In cross-sectional analyses, we show that this relationship is driven by conditions when the need for collaboration and information sharing is high and when managers are less experienced. Additional tests exploring the mechanisms for the role of upward influencers in teams suggest that they impair team horizontal relationships through lowering the willingness to communicate, share knowledge, and offer mutual assistance among team members. Yet, teams with upward influencers build better vertical relationships with supervisors, which, in return, is associated with supervisors allocating more of their time to provide team members with feedback and guidance. Taken together, this study contributes to the understanding of upward influencers in teams.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143258354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12599","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12599","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12599","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679X.12600","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679X.12600","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"63 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679X.12600","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142991838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates how U.S. private firms communicate with investors around private securities offerings. Using multiple research methods including survey, interview, and archival analysis, I provide systematic evidence on private firms' public and private disclosure practices. I find that despite engaging in a low level of public disclosures, private firms actively communicate with investors through private communication channels, with notable variation across firms in terms of content and frequency. Consistent with managers providing relevant information, financial information is disclosed when it is particularly useful for investors' decision-making. Furthermore, I explore the relation between private communication and public disclosure preferences and find a substitutive effect, suggesting that private firms may strategically manage communication channels to effectively engage with investors. This study contributes to the literature by describing the existing disclosure landscape of private firms.
{"title":"Financial Reporting Around Private Firms' Securities Offerings","authors":"YIRAN KANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12598","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how U.S. private firms communicate with investors around private securities offerings. Using multiple research methods including survey, interview, and archival analysis, I provide systematic evidence on private firms' public and private disclosure practices. I find that despite engaging in a low level of public disclosures, private firms actively communicate with investors through private communication channels, with notable variation across firms in terms of content and frequency. Consistent with managers providing relevant information, financial information is disclosed when it is particularly useful for investors' decision-making. Furthermore, I explore the relation between private communication and public disclosure preferences and find a substitutive effect, suggesting that private firms may strategically manage communication channels to effectively engage with investors. This study contributes to the literature by describing the existing disclosure landscape of private firms.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142987133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce the idea of cross-regulatory disclosure avoidance, whereby firms attempt to counteract expansions of disclosure under one regulation through actions that reduce disclosure under a different one. We study whether firms redact information from material contracts when they face new rules to disclose segment information. Using SFAS No. 131 as a plausibly exogenous shock to segment disclosure, we find that firms increasing the number of reported segments after the rule change exhibit a greater increase in redaction than firms maintaining the same number of segments. Consistent with proprietary cost motives, the increases are concentrated among firms with greater divergence in profitability across segments, higher abnormal segment profitability, and more negative abnormal stock returns in response to the finalization of the rule. Also, treated firms that redact after the rule change have abnormally profitable segments that they previously did not disclose. Firms that observables predict would increase redaction but did not experience declines in sales growth and profit margin. We find no evidence that agency cost motives drive the increases in redaction or, more generally, nondisclosure of segment performance before SFAS No. 131.
{"title":"Redaction as Cross-Regulatory Disclosure Avoidance","authors":"IOANNIS V. FLOROS, SHANE A. JOHNSON, WANJIA ZHAO","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12596","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce the idea of cross-regulatory disclosure avoidance, whereby firms attempt to counteract expansions of disclosure under one regulation through actions that reduce disclosure under a different one. We study whether firms redact information from material contracts when they face new rules to disclose segment information. Using SFAS No. 131 as a plausibly exogenous shock to segment disclosure, we find that firms increasing the number of reported segments after the rule change exhibit a greater increase in redaction than firms maintaining the same number of segments. Consistent with proprietary cost motives, the increases are concentrated among firms with greater divergence in profitability across segments, higher abnormal segment profitability, and more negative abnormal stock returns in response to the finalization of the rule. Also, treated firms that redact after the rule change have abnormally profitable segments that they previously did not disclose. Firms that observables predict would increase redaction but did not experience declines in sales growth and profit margin. We find no evidence that agency cost motives drive the increases in redaction or, more generally, nondisclosure of segment performance before SFAS No. 131.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142940278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a novel measure of CEO depression by applying machine learning models that analyze vocal acoustic features from CEOs' conference call recordings. Our research was preregistered via the Journal of Accounting Research's registration-based editorial process. In this study, we validate this measure and examine associated factors. We find that greater firm risk is positively associated with CEO depression, whereas higher job demands are negatively associated with CEO depression. Female and older CEOs show a lower likelihood of depression. Using this novel measure, we then explore the relationship between CEO depression and career outcomes. Although we do not find any evidence that CEO depression is associated with CEO turnover, we find some evidence that turnover-performance sensitivity is higher among depressed CEOs. We also find limited evidence of higher compensation and higher pay-performance sensitivity for depressed CEOs. This study provides new insights into the relationship between CEO mental health and career outcomes.
{"title":"Silent Suffering: Using Machine Learning to Measure CEO Depression","authors":"SUNG-YUAN (MARK) CHENG, NARGESS M. GOLSHAN","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12590","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a novel measure of CEO depression by applying machine learning models that analyze vocal acoustic features from CEOs' conference call recordings. Our research was preregistered via the <i>Journal of Accounting Research</i>'s registration-based editorial process. In this study, we validate this measure and examine associated factors. We find that greater firm risk is positively associated with CEO depression, whereas higher job demands are negatively associated with CEO depression. Female and older CEOs show a lower likelihood of depression. Using this novel measure, we then explore the relationship between CEO depression and career outcomes. Although we do not find any evidence that CEO depression is associated with CEO turnover, we find some evidence that turnover-performance sensitivity is higher among depressed CEOs. We also find limited evidence of higher compensation and higher pay-performance sensitivity for depressed CEOs. This study provides new insights into the relationship between CEO mental health and career outcomes.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142936443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MICHELLE L. NESSA, ANH V. PERSSON, JANE Z. SONG, ERIN M. TOWERY, MARY E. VERNON
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCR) for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to help tax authorities combat tax-motivated income shifting. This study uses confidential U.S. tax administrative data from 2011 to 2018 to examine the effect of U.S. CbCR adoption on the tax-motivated income shifting and real activities of U.S. MNEs. We first document that while U.S. CbCR provides the Internal Revenue Service with incremental information about the location of U.S. MNEs’ global activities relative to existing U.S. tax return disclosures, substantial overlap exists between U.S. CbCR and existing disclosures. In contrast with prior CbCR studies in cross-country settings, we fail to find evidence of a change in U.S. MNEs’ tax-motivated income shifting or a reallocation of real activities based on tax incentives in response to U.S. CbCR using multiple empirical approaches. Overall, our study leverages U.S. tax administrative data to provide insights into the impact of the CbCR initiative on U.S. MNEs.
{"title":"The Effect of U.S. Country-by-Country Reporting on U.S. Multinationals’ Tax-Motivated Income Shifting and Real Activities","authors":"MICHELLE L. NESSA, ANH V. PERSSON, JANE Z. SONG, ERIN M. TOWERY, MARY E. VERNON","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.12594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12594","url":null,"abstract":"The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCR) for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to help tax authorities combat tax-motivated income shifting. This study uses confidential U.S. tax administrative data from 2011 to 2018 to examine the effect of U.S. CbCR adoption on the tax-motivated income shifting and real activities of U.S. MNEs. We first document that while U.S. CbCR provides the Internal Revenue Service with incremental information about the location of U.S. MNEs’ global activities relative to existing U.S. tax return disclosures, substantial overlap exists between U.S. CbCR and existing disclosures. In contrast with prior CbCR studies in cross-country settings, we fail to find evidence of a change in U.S. MNEs’ tax-motivated income shifting or a reallocation of real activities based on tax incentives in response to U.S. CbCR using multiple empirical approaches. Overall, our study leverages U.S. tax administrative data to provide insights into the impact of the CbCR initiative on U.S. MNEs.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142935104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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