{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70048","url":null,"abstract":"Click on the article title to read more.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147507699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70047","url":null,"abstract":"Click on the article title to read more.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147507792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Women often lack the opportunity to join exclusive social clubs, limiting the benefits they derive from their social networks. We investigate whether, when given the opportunity to interact with the right people in a professional setting, women gain greater advantages from these connections for career performance and advancement compared to men. Using a unique data set that documents when, where, and with whom financial analysts interact at investor conferences, we find that female analysts show greater improvement in earnings forecast accuracy than their male counterparts after interacting with a firm's executives. Further evidence suggests that female analysts overcome homophily in conference interactions with executives and that they sustain their gains, enhancing forecast accuracy for up to three years. In addition, both the capital and labor markets recognize women's superior gains from conference connections. Our findings suggest that women capitalize on professional connections, highlighting the importance of promoting structured networking opportunities for women in professional environments.
{"title":"Beyond Old Boys' Clubs: Financial Analysts' Utilization of Professional Connections","authors":"MENGQIAO DU, RACHEL XI ZHANG","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70044","url":null,"abstract":"Women often lack the opportunity to join exclusive social clubs, limiting the benefits they derive from their social networks. We investigate whether, when given the opportunity to interact with the right people in a professional setting, women gain greater advantages from these connections for career performance and advancement compared to men. Using a unique data set that documents when, where, and with whom financial analysts interact at investor conferences, we find that female analysts show greater improvement in earnings forecast accuracy than their male counterparts after interacting with a firm's executives. Further evidence suggests that female analysts overcome homophily in conference interactions with executives and that they sustain their gains, enhancing forecast accuracy for up to three years. In addition, both the capital and labor markets recognize women's superior gains from conference connections. Our findings suggest that women capitalize on professional connections, highlighting the importance of promoting structured networking opportunities for women in professional environments.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147360891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
VERENA BRAUN, ROBERT F. GÖX, FELIX P. NIGGEMANN, ULRICH SCHÄFER
This study examines how the subjectivity in measuring fair values of assets without readily observable market prices affects investment efficiency and shareholder value. When fair values are objective measures of asset value, they facilitate efficient investment decisions that align with shareholder interests. In contrast, firms' reliance on subjective valuation inputs causes underinvestment in long-term projects. If fair values are highly subjective, they may lead firms to favor less profitable short-term projects with objectively measurable fair values. When project returns are positively correlated, subjectivity in valuing long-term projects induces overinvestment in short-term projects with objective fair values. Regardless of these distortions, fair value measurement can add shareholder value. Not measuring fair values altogether leads to underinvestment, which moderately subjective fair values can alleviate.
{"title":"Real Effects of Subjectivity in Measuring Fair Values","authors":"VERENA BRAUN, ROBERT F. GÖX, FELIX P. NIGGEMANN, ULRICH SCHÄFER","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70045","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how the subjectivity in measuring fair values of assets without readily observable market prices affects investment efficiency and shareholder value. When fair values are objective measures of asset value, they facilitate efficient investment decisions that align with shareholder interests. In contrast, firms' reliance on subjective valuation inputs causes underinvestment in long-term projects. If fair values are highly subjective, they may lead firms to favor less profitable short-term projects with objectively measurable fair values. When project returns are positively correlated, subjectivity in valuing long-term projects induces overinvestment in short-term projects with objective fair values. Regardless of these distortions, fair value measurement can add shareholder value. Not measuring fair values altogether leads to underinvestment, which moderately subjective fair values can alleviate.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147351235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, I explore how accounting rules—in particular the restrictiveness of GAAP—have impacted the labor market for accountants. I find that when the rules become more restrictive, there are fewer students majoring in accounting and fewer accountants and auditors overall. The overall number of accounting positions that firms recruit for does not decrease when the rules become more restrictive; however, the nature of accountants' work changes. There is less focus on tasks such as applying judgment, thinking creatively, and thinking critically and more focus on determining compliance. Despite the decrease in accountants, earnings for accountants do not increase, and the wage distribution becomes more compressed. I supplement these analyses with a survey‐based field experiment and find that the salience of restrictiveness heightens students' views of accounting as a profession where they are unable to use creative and critical thinking. Overall, the findings suggest that restrictive regulation can shift the task content of occupations and reduce the pool of individuals interested in the profession.
{"title":"Accounting Rules and the Labor Market for Accountants","authors":"ANTHONY LE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70043","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, I explore how accounting rules—in particular the restrictiveness of GAAP—have impacted the labor market for accountants. I find that when the rules become more restrictive, there are fewer students majoring in accounting and fewer accountants and auditors overall. The overall number of accounting positions that firms recruit for does not decrease when the rules become more restrictive; however, the nature of accountants' work changes. There is less focus on tasks such as applying judgment, thinking creatively, and thinking critically and more focus on determining compliance. Despite the decrease in accountants, earnings for accountants do not increase, and the wage distribution becomes more compressed. I supplement these analyses with a survey‐based field experiment and find that the salience of restrictiveness heightens students' views of accounting as a profession where they are unable to use creative and critical thinking. Overall, the findings suggest that restrictive regulation can shift the task content of occupations and reduce the pool of individuals interested in the profession.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146215760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulators are contemplating or mandating precise measurement of financial climate‐risk exposure to promote sustainable investments. We show that such mandates can be counterproductive in the presence of social funds that catalyze change by subsidizing the adoption of cleaner production technologies. Firms can exploit a social fund's impact motive by measuring their climate‐risk exposure imprecisely. This strategic imprecision prevents the fund from distinguishing between firms that require subsidies and those that would switch to clean technologies for financial reasons alone, thereby increasing the ex ante subsidies firms can extract. A by‐product of this rent‐seeking behavior is that firms adopt clean technologies more frequently than would be jointly efficient under precise measurement. Our analysis suggests that the regulatory push for precise climate‐risk measurement can reduce social funds' impact and the frequency of green transitions.
{"title":"Financial Climate‐Risk Measurement, Impact Funds, and Green Transitions","authors":"VOLKER LAUX, LUCAS MAHIEUX","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70042","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators are contemplating or mandating precise measurement of financial climate‐risk exposure to promote sustainable investments. We show that such mandates can be counterproductive in the presence of social funds that catalyze change by subsidizing the adoption of cleaner production technologies. Firms can exploit a social fund's impact motive by measuring their climate‐risk exposure imprecisely. This strategic imprecision prevents the fund from distinguishing between firms that require subsidies and those that would switch to clean technologies for financial reasons alone, thereby increasing the ex ante subsidies firms can extract. A by‐product of this rent‐seeking behavior is that firms adopt clean technologies more frequently than would be jointly efficient under precise measurement. Our analysis suggests that the regulatory push for precise climate‐risk measurement can reduce social funds' impact and the frequency of green transitions.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146169592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how partisan alignment between city leaders and state governors shapes information processing and bond pricing in the municipal bond market. Using a novel data set on 1,045 U.S. cities from 2005 to 2019, we show that cities with the same political affiliation as the state governor face 9 basis points lower borrowing costs than misaligned cities. The effect is stronger for riskier bonds, in states where governors hold greater authority, and for fiscally dependent cities. Aligned cities also receive more aid during fiscal distress. Partisan alignment shapes how investors interpret and respond to financial information: Nondisclosure and adverse audit findings raise borrowing costs primarily for misaligned cities, while penalties for aligned cities are markedly smaller.
{"title":"Partisan Cities: How State-Local Political Alignment Shapes Credit Risk and Information Processing in the Municipal Bond Market","authors":"RAMONA DAGOSTINO, ANYA NAKHMURINA","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how partisan alignment between city leaders and state governors shapes information processing and bond pricing in the municipal bond market. Using a novel data set on 1,045 U.S. cities from 2005 to 2019, we show that cities with the same political affiliation as the state governor face 9 basis points lower borrowing costs than misaligned cities. The effect is stronger for riskier bonds, in states where governors hold greater authority, and for fiscally dependent cities. Aligned cities also receive more aid during fiscal distress. Partisan alignment shapes how investors interpret and respond to financial information: Nondisclosure and adverse audit findings raise borrowing costs primarily for misaligned cities, while penalties for aligned cities are markedly smaller.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146115751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effective policymakers must balance the demands of formulating a corporate tax system that raises revenue and spurs economic activity (e.g., investment) while promoting a “level playing field” across firms. Balancing these tradeoffs has likely caused tax systems to become more complex over time, increasing firms’ difficulty in understanding and complying with tax regulations. We investigate the impact of tax system complexity on the responsiveness of firm‐level investment to tax policy changes. Exploiting staggered tax rate changes and variation in tax system complexity across countries, we document two key findings. First, firm‐level investment is less sensitive to changes in the corporate tax rate when tax system complexity is higher, suggesting that such complexity can undermine the ability of tax policy to affect economic growth. Second, the impact of tax complexity on the sensitivity of investment to tax rate changes varies significantly across firms, with domestic‐owned, smaller, and private firms being more affected. These cross‐sectional disparities are consistent with tax system complexity potentially reducing tax system parity. Collectively, our findings suggest that corporate tax system complexity can negatively impact the ability of fiscal policy to affect investment and lead to heterogeneous tax policy responses across firms.
{"title":"Corporate Tax System Complexity and Investment Sensitivity to Tax Policy Changes","authors":"HARALD AMBERGER, JOHN GALLEMORE, JARON WILDE","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70040","url":null,"abstract":"Effective policymakers must balance the demands of formulating a corporate tax system that raises revenue and spurs economic activity (e.g., investment) while promoting a “level playing field” across firms. Balancing these tradeoffs has likely caused tax systems to become more complex over time, increasing firms’ difficulty in understanding and complying with tax regulations. We investigate the impact of tax system complexity on the responsiveness of firm‐level investment to tax policy changes. Exploiting staggered tax rate changes and variation in tax system complexity across countries, we document two key findings. First, firm‐level investment is less sensitive to changes in the corporate tax rate when tax system complexity is higher, suggesting that such complexity can undermine the ability of tax policy to affect economic growth. Second, the impact of tax complexity on the sensitivity of investment to tax rate changes varies significantly across firms, with domestic‐owned, smaller, and private firms being more affected. These cross‐sectional disparities are consistent with tax system complexity potentially reducing tax system parity. Collectively, our findings suggest that corporate tax system complexity can negatively impact the ability of fiscal policy to affect investment and lead to heterogeneous tax policy responses across firms.","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Request for Papers","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70037","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679x.70037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679x.70037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1475-679x.70038","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1475-679x.70038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48414,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Research","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2026-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-679x.70038","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146056053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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