Litigation with adversarial efforts

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2021.106042
Roy Baharad , Chen Cohen , Shmuel Nitzan
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We consider a simple model of litigation contests in which each party dedicates both “case-advancing” efforts that directly increase her probability of winning, as well as “adversarial” efforts, which harm her opponent’s strategy and decrease his likelihood of prevailing. Our model characterizes adversarial litigation efforts and the equilibrium investment in such efforts by both parties, subject to the value of winning and the costs of adversarial efforts vis-à-vis case-advancing ones. We find that litigation will always involve adversarial efforts if awards are sufficiently high, and that litigation in which most efforts are adversarial is a plausible scenario. Furthermore, in a relatively symmetric litigation that involves high awards, adversarial efforts increase the parties' likelihood of reaching a settlement agreement. In asymmetric cases, however, the existence of adversarial efforts inhibits settlement irrespective of the awards at stake.

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对抗性诉讼
我们考虑一个简单的诉讼竞赛模型,其中每一方都致力于“推进案件”的努力,这直接增加了自己获胜的可能性,同时也致力于“对抗”的努力,这损害了对手的策略,降低了他获胜的可能性。我们的模型描述了对抗性诉讼的努力和双方在这种努力中的均衡投资,这取决于胜诉的价值和对抗性努力相对于-à-vis案件推进的成本。我们发现,如果赔偿金额足够高,诉讼总是会涉及对抗性努力,而大多数努力都是对抗性的诉讼是一种合理的情况。此外,在涉及高额赔偿的相对对称的诉讼中,对抗努力增加了双方达成和解协议的可能性。然而,在不对称的情况下,对抗性努力的存在阻碍了和解,而不管裁决是否攸关。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
18.20%
发文量
38
审稿时长
48 days
期刊介绍: The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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