Pandemic Threat, Ostrom Threshold and Pre-Emptive Public Goods: why East Asia performed better in the COVID-19 crisis

R. Fabella
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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic is an eminent threat posed by nature to the survival of the whole community. The cost X it imposes upon the community can be mitigated by the community’s pre-emptive public goods: an early warning system, capacity for monitoring, contact tracing and isolating infected persons, the strength of its public health system and the cultivated readiness to cooperate with anti-COVID protocols. The community provides these public goods in a nonstrategic game N (Nature) where the probability of a “bad outcome” (being symptomatically infected) falls with the total spending on pre-emptive public goods. Aside from N, members of the community play an Economic Dilemma Game (EDG), a symmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with strategy set (C, D), where the community earns its economic income which in turn provides the financing of the pre-emptive public goods. Games EDG and N are fused into a composite game N+EDG by defining the probability of a good outcome as increasing with the level of public goods financing. N+EDG has the same strategy set (C, D) as EDG but the payoffs of players are composite: the payoff from EDG less the expected share of the pandemic cost to the members. We show that there is a threshold pandemic cost X0 (Ostrom threshold) so that if X ≥ X0, the N+EDG has dominant strategy in C. At the cooperative equilibrium, the community is at its peak strength: economic output from EDG is largest and the contribution to pre-emptive public good is highest. A severe-enough cost of the pandemic threat as perceived by the group (i) causes players to exhibit an altruistic phenotype (choosing C every time) and (ii) leads to the lowest probability of a bad outcome. We argue that previous experience with pandemics in the last two decades on top of a higher tendency to follow authority in East Asia supported both the provision of better pre-emptive public goods and the higher abidance with anti-COVID protocols. These explain better performance.
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大流行威胁、奥斯特罗姆阈值和先发制人的公共产品:为什么东亚在2019冠状病毒病危机中表现更好
新冠肺炎大流行是大自然对整个社区生存构成的突出威胁。它给社区带来的成本X可以通过社区先发制人的公共产品来减轻:预警系统、监测、接触者追踪和隔离感染者的能力、公共卫生系统的力量以及与抗击新冠病毒协议合作的培养意愿。社区在非策略游戏N(自然)中提供这些公共产品,其中“不良结果”(症状感染)的概率随着先发制人的公共产品的总支出而下降。除了N,社区成员还玩经济困境游戏(EDG),这是一种具有策略集(C,D)的对称囚犯困境游戏(PDG),社区赚取经济收入,进而为先发制人的公共产品提供融资。通过将好结果的概率定义为随着公共产品融资水平的增加而增加,EDG和N游戏融合为一个复合游戏N+EDG。N+EDG与EDG有相同的策略集(C,D),但参与者的回报是复合的:EDG的回报减去成员在疫情成本中的预期份额。我们证明了存在一个阈值流行病成本X0(Ostrom阈值),因此如果X≥X0,N+EDG在C中具有主导策略。在合作均衡下,社区处于其峰值强度:EDG的经济产出最大,对先发制人的公共利益的贡献最高。该组认为,疫情威胁的严重代价(i)导致玩家表现出利他表型(每次选择C),以及(ii)导致不良结果的概率最低。我们认为,在过去二十年中,除了东亚更倾向于遵循权威之外,以前的流行病经验支持提供更好的先发制人的公共产品,并更严格地遵守抗新冠肺炎协议。这些解释了更好的性能。
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