Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect Principal's returns: Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning

IF 5.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Management Science and Engineering Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jmse.2022.12.004
Chuan Ding , Yang Li , Zhenyu Cui
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation. Simultaneously, the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff. We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning. Furthermore, we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal.

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理解异质代理人如何影响委托人的回报:来自短期主义和贝叶斯学习的视角
考虑了代理异质性和短期性条件下最优契约设计的一般框架。研究表明,最优契约必须权衡代理人的信息租金、激励成本和利益,以克服契约的逆向选择和道德风险。道德水平较高的人更有可能选择更努力、更少操纵。同时,委托人提供的激励更低,获得的收益更显著。我们还扩展了我们的模型来研究贝叶斯学习的好处。通过对一般模型和学习模型下委托人收益的比较,发现学习契约能给委托人带来更大的收益。
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来源期刊
Journal of Management Science and Engineering
Journal of Management Science and Engineering Engineering-Engineering (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
3.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
108 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science (JEAS) is the official journal of the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (CUFE), Egypt, established in 1816. The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science publishes fundamental and applied research articles and reviews spanning different areas of engineering disciplines, applications, and interdisciplinary topics.
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