{"title":"Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect Principal's returns: Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning","authors":"Chuan Ding , Yang Li , Zhenyu Cui","doi":"10.1016/j.jmse.2022.12.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation. Simultaneously, the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff. We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning. Furthermore, we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36172,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Management Science and Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096232023000173","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents with higher moral levels were more likely to choose higher effort and lower manipulation. Simultaneously, the principal offers lower incentives and receives more significant payoff. We also extend our model to investigate the benefits of Bayesian learning. Furthermore, we compare the principal's returns in general and learning models and find that the learning contract can bring more profit to the principal.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science (JEAS) is the official journal of the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University (CUFE), Egypt, established in 1816.
The Journal of Engineering and Applied Science publishes fundamental and applied research articles and reviews spanning different areas of engineering disciplines, applications, and interdisciplinary topics.