“Turkey’s State Crisis: Institutions, Reform, and Conflict” Book Review

Abstract

In Turkey’s State Crisis: Institutions, Reform and Conflict, Bülent Aras provides a comprehensive examination of the derailment and the eventual halt of the reform process initiated by the AKP in the early 2000s, pinpoints agents, structural elements, and hallmark developments that instigated a vicious cycle of political polarization, rising authoritarianism, deinstitutionalization in Turkey, altogether which intensified the current state crisis, and finally presents policy recommendations for reinstating a constructive reform process in all areas of the state. Based on his extensive experience working within the Turkish state apparatus and a rich blend of interviews with policymakers and state elites, the author provides a robust analysis of the historical, political, and geopolitical background of the ongoing state crisis. Chapter 1 analyzes the root causes and characteristics of the political crisis in Turkey from the perspectives of political and institutional reforms. The author states that the 2002–2010 period of the AKP governments functioned as a transition from tutelary democracy to hybrid governance, wherein the established nationalist-secular elements within the judiciary, bureaucracy, and the army collaborated to counter what they deemed as an assault on secular and Kemalist nature of the state. This was evident in their approach to sensitive issues such as the Kurdish question, rights of sub-identities, and the potential growth of the influence of Islam in Turkish politics. At this stage, Erdogan, and by extension the AKP elite, presented themselves as a powerless government with an emphasis on vulnerability vis-à-vis the establishment. The author argues that with strategic and tactical retooling as well as building alliances with the Gulenists and the other conservative constituencies, Erdogan was able to win the battle and advance the reform agenda. The author argues that such determination and political resolve fueled political and institutional reform at all levels of the state and singled out Turkey as a model country in the region. However, the author observes, this was to change throughout the next decade (2010–2020), a period characterized by authoritarian drift, populism, and deinstitutionalization. Faced with an array of adverse developments such as the Mavi Marmara incident, graft probes, growing Kurdish opposition, and finally the 2016 coup attempt perpetrated by FETO, the AKP changed its domestic alliances and opted for securitizing domestic as well as foreign politics.