{"title":"Markovian strategies with continuous and impulse controls for a differential game model of revolution","authors":"W. Ruan","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2020.1726344","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with a piecewise-deterministic differential game model of political regime changes. We modify and study the model proposed by Boucekkine et al. in [7]. The original model does not allow all players to take full controls as the situation progresses. Hence, it does not lead to closed-loop strategies. We fix the problem by deriving and using a system of quasi-variational inequalities associated with the differential game, and proving a criterion for the regime change. As a result, we find Markovian strategies for all players. A numerical example for illustration of the method is given. Implications of the results to political changes in a society are discussed. Some results are extended to more general models that incorporate gradual and abrupt changes, as well as continuous and impulse controls.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0022250X.2020.1726344","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2020.1726344","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with a piecewise-deterministic differential game model of political regime changes. We modify and study the model proposed by Boucekkine et al. in [7]. The original model does not allow all players to take full controls as the situation progresses. Hence, it does not lead to closed-loop strategies. We fix the problem by deriving and using a system of quasi-variational inequalities associated with the differential game, and proving a criterion for the regime change. As a result, we find Markovian strategies for all players. A numerical example for illustration of the method is given. Implications of the results to political changes in a society are discussed. Some results are extended to more general models that incorporate gradual and abrupt changes, as well as continuous and impulse controls.
期刊介绍：
The goal of the Journal of Mathematical Sociology is to publish models and mathematical techniques that would likely be useful to professional sociologists. The Journal also welcomes papers of mutual interest to social scientists and other social and behavioral scientists, as well as papers by non-social scientists that may encourage fruitful connections between sociology and other disciplines. Reviews of new or developing areas of mathematics and mathematical modeling that may have significant applications in sociology will also be considered.
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology is published in association with the International Network for Social Network Analysis, the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology, the Mathematical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association, and the Methodology Section of the American Sociological Association.
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